Their liberalism and our multiculturalism?

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Books reviewed

Favell, Adrian (2001) *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. 2nd edn/1st pbk edn. Basingstoke and London: Palgrave, formerly Macmillan, 320 pp., ISBN: 0-333-94593-X

Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, xii + 379 pp., ISBN 0-333-60882-8

Spinner-Halev, Jeff (2000) *Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, x + 246 pp., ISBN 0-8018-6346-5

Multiculturalism emerged as a policy idea in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in education. It gave way, however, under pressure not just from the right but also from anti-racists, who criticised it as obscuring racism and subordination and from the post-anti-racists who argued that it 'essentialised' cultures and ethnic groups. In recent years it has made a comeback. This time it is much more likely to be employed by political theorists and its use in Britain owes much to its growing centrality in current Anglophone political philosophy. Indeed, this latest use is largely imported from Canada and the United States. Several Britons have made notable contributions to this new theorising but none more so than Bhikhu Parekh. In a long string of journal articles, book chapters and conference papers he has developed a point of view that has not only benefited from his wide reading in political philosophy—historical and contemporary,

western and Indian—but from his ongoing political engagement with the issues of equality and minorities in Britain and India. These resources have enabled him to develop a distinctive voice that is a counterpoint to North American academic liberalism. *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, his first book-length statement on the subject, exemplifies all these strengths. It is profound, original and wide-ranging, yet accessible to non-specialists.

Parekh's concern is not with 'difference' as such. The diversity he is interested in is not confined to a limited deviation from prevailing norms (as in the case of a 'sub-culture' of homosexuality) but one that embodies a complex of alternative cultures sustained by distinct communities (Parekh 2000, 3–4). This communal diversity, Parekh believes, is not peculiar to modern societies, but in the contemporary period is typified by the arrival and settlement of migrant groups from outside the west into western societies, each of which has historically thought of itself as united by a single national culture and which has often enjoyed ties of colonial domination with the sending country. It is this post-war phenomenon that is the occasion of Parekh's theorising and most of his detailed discussions relate to this. The book's greatest virtue, however, is the connections it makes between metaphysics, moral philosophy, political theory and public policy. This makes it, as far as multiculturalism is concerned, unique.

Beyond liberalism

Parekh rejects the dominant philosophical traditions that assert or imply that only one way of life is fully human. This moral monism is found amongst even those liberals who are best known as celebrators of diversity. J. S. Mill, for example, cherished individuality not cultural diversity and was prone to assume superiority over non-western cultures, leading to justifications of 'paternal despotism' and imperialism in Asia and Africa (Parekh 2000, 45). Parekh recognises that contemporary liberals are concerned to remedy these historic liabilities and engages at some length with the key ideas from John Rawls, Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka. He concludes that while liberalism is the political doctrine most hospitable to cultural diversity, we need to go beyond it. I would identify two moves here in Parekh's thinking. First, we need to make a more radical break with moral monism; secondly, we need to take a less liberal view of culture. Liberalism takes a clear, individualist view of what is the ultimate good for human beings and uses it as a standard to judge all actual and possible societies. It thus universalises itself while relativising all other cultures and societies. All other ways of living become particular, historical and

contingent; of value to some, or at a moment in time or as a means to individual autonomy, but not a universal good. It may be much more open, minimalist and thus less judgemental and more inclusive than many other monisms but it nevertheless operates with a uniform view of human nature. And in a 'the west and the rest' manner it divides all societies and perspectives into two: those that are acceptable to liberals and those that are not. Hence, for liberals the multicultural question is how is liberalism to cope with non-liberal groups (in American political theory usually and quite unselfconsciously referred to as 'illiberal groups'). Parekh's solution is to relativise liberalism by seeking a higher philosophical vantage point from which liberalism is no less particular than its rivals.

Turning to the second point, he urges us to take a less instrumental view of culture. Viewing a culture in terms of options and choices is an inadequate characterisation of how we are constituted by and relate to our own culture. Some people would say they love their culture and are not sufficiently detached from it to evaluate it in terms of its functions. 'Obviously love of one's culture should not blind one to its faults, but that is very different from making it a function of its desirable qualities' (Parekh 2000, 99). Moreover, in what is probably his most specific original contribution, he points out that liberal arguments about why culture matters to individuals cannot reach the purported conclusion that cultural diversity matters. It can make the majority aware that minority cultures matter to their members but that is only an indirect argument for diversity. For Parekh, multiculturalism is not about the rights of minority cultures but about the value of cultural diversity. The value of the presence of a variety of cultures in a society cannot be understood as increasing our options, for other cultures are rarely options for us. Rather, their sense of contrast gives us a deeper understanding of our own culture and makes us reflect and learn about the diversity of humanity.

Hence, Parekh is committed to a universalism but its not liberalism; it is a meta-ethical commitment to the cultural diversity that constitutes humanity, an understanding of humanity that eludes every culture but is glimpsed in the dialogue between cultures. It is an understanding of a humanity that is much bigger than any '-ism', that is hinted at in Oakeshott's 'conversation of mankind'. Parekh distinguishes his humanism from moral monism by arguing that human nature is always mediated by a culture; the interaction of human nature and culture is such that we can never isolate an aspect of personality or a cultural practice and say *that* is human nature. Moreover, human nature might consist of certain tendencies and aversions but they can be shaped by culture and manifest themselves in

quite different ways so by themselves they can never explain human behaviour or justify a way of life.

He does, however, think that some kind of moral universalism follows. On the whole he thinks it will be relatively minimal and will consist of fairly general abstract concepts, such as 'human rights', which are susceptible to different interpretations within different moral traditions and societies. He thinks, of course, that such universal values cannot be worked out within one moral tradition, such as liberalism, but necessarily entail a dialogue of equals between all moral traditions. This is a difficult and complex enterprise that requires considerable self-humility and sensitivity to the views of cultures other than one's own. The current circumstances of western hegemony are not conducive to it, but he thinks it is achievable and instances the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights as a document that approximates to his dialectical and pluralist form of minimal universalism (Parekh 2000, 133–134). Readers of Parekh's previous work on multiculturalism may be surprised to the extent that universalism features in his larger philosophy but they may also feel that it is a very thin universalism. For example, Parekh clearly sides with those exponents of 'Asian values', such as the signatories of the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, who argue that human rights have to be defined and applied in the light of local history, culture and religious backgrounds. In particular, he argues that human rights should not always be legal rights against the state, but can be realised within a communitarian moral framework based on mutual concern and solidarity (ibid., 135–136); and that morally justifiable trade-offs between human rights and, say, filial piety and good neighbourliness are compatible with universalism even though some cultures may not produce the moral balance that liberals would.

Political multiculturalism

Multiculturalism, then, for Parekh is a form of (highly qualified) universalism. Its primary political implication is that liberals need to go beyond toleration and accommodation of other cultures to a dialogue with them and this dialogue has to be institutionalised. The political structure of each just society will, however, vary, for it ought to reflect and be a product of an equal dialogue of the diverse cultural communities within that society. Amongst its preconditions are 'freedom of expression, agreed procedures and basic ethical norms, participatory public spaces, equal rights, a responsive and popularly accountable structure of authority, and empowerment of citizens' (Parekh 2000, 340). It is also likely to require giving encouragement

and support thorough public resources to minority cultures, which may be suffering from oppression and marginalisation, to rebuild confidence in themselves, resist the pressures of assimilation, enjoy equal cultural citizenship and through interaction with dominant cultures enrich society for all (ibid., 108). This last point is important. The public policy benefit of supporting minority cultures is not just upon its effects upon members of that minority but upon the whole of society (ibid., 196).

Using this perspective, Parekh argues that the modern state is too homogenising and insistent on a symmetrical federation because it privileges territorial identity. Yet provinces such as Quebec and Kashmir represent cultural communities that may need special status. Parekh takes this idea further to sever the link between territory and representation, arguing that there may sometimes be a need for a culturally based federal structure, when cultures within a polity cannot neatly be demarcated by territory. He is careful to stress that a multicultural society has to make provision for fostering unity as well as diversity. At one level this is achieved through the creation of a common culture, which all should enjoy the right and opportunity to participate in but which will inevitably reflect the bias of the long-established culture (Parekh 2000, 221). A common culture cannot be officially engineered but Parekh distinguishes his view from those he calls 'civic assimilationists' by emphasising that a common culture will necessarily be found in both the public and the private realms (ibid., 219–224). A common belonging, however, lies primarily in the evolution of a national identity. It too cannot be culturally neutral but should have the power to evoke deep historical memories while including minorities within it (ibid., 235). He believes, however, that national identity is exclusively located in a society's political culture, not its habits, temperament, attitude to life, sexual practices, customs, family structure, body language, hobbies and so on (ibid., 231–232).

I think this is too restrictive of the meaning of a national identity. It would mean that the idea of developing a British Islam or an Indian Islam—that is to say, an Islam that was adapted to the culture of a particular country—would seem difficult to conceptualise. Yet this kind of separation between culture and politics seems to be out of character with Parekh's philosophy as a whole. If national identity is located in the political structure and not in ethno-cultural terms, then how can ethnic identities be included in the definition of a national identity as Parekh strongly recommends? Moreover, his view seems to make it difficult to make assertions such as that the French language is part of French national identity, or that the Welsh had a national identity before devolution. Similarly, I think more

ethnic minority persons in Britain want to be part of a British identity in a non-assimilationist way than want to reduce British identity to the political. Here Parekh seems to be using a civic-ethnic/cultural distinction that for the most part he is opposed to.

Besides outlining the general features of a political theory of multi-culturalism Parekh devotes over a quarter of the book to elaborating his theory through real multicultural dilemmas. A dozen that are evoked to illustrate the logic of intercultural evaluation are listed on pages 264–265 but these far from exhaust the cases that are discussed in this and other parts of the book. This way of grounding political theory is one I much sympathise with but space does not permit me here to elaborate on Parekh's discussion. Nevertheless, some general points can be made about his choice of examples. They are mainly to be found in chapters 8, 9 and 10 and consist of recent and current controversies in the west, especially in western Europe, mainly arising from the cultural practices or demands of recent migrants from Asia and Africa. The majority of the cases refer to the religion of these people; in more than half the cases the religion is Islam, including the two cases that are given the lengthiest attention, *The Satanic Verses* affair (Parekh 2000, 295–321) and polygamy (ibid., 262–272). The former is a crisis that Parekh played an important part in moderating but he writes on it here with a freshness as well as his previous even-handedness. He reaffirms that while Muslims were right to protest against the book (ibid., 321) but not to threaten the life of the author, they no less than their critics failed to be sensitive to the legitimate sensibilities of their opponents. The case is used to illustrate the logic of political discourse and to critique those such as Rawls and Habermas who take too cerebral a view of (political) argument (ibid., 307–311).

The discussion on polygamy is as rare as it is fascinating but perhaps tries to do too much. It starts from asking if any kind of polygamy should be permitted but soon takes the form of a competition between the virtues of polygamy and monogamy. Parekh does not just dismiss the former if interpreted as an exclusive male right, but believes it can be clearly contrasted with current western practices. In fact a more sociological position might suggest that while some Muslims defend polygamy as an article of faith, urban Muslims the world over are, in practice, amongst the strictest monogamists. Informal polygamy (what sociologists call 'multiple partnering') and staggered polygamy (a.k.a. 'serial monogamy'), on the other hand, while of many sorts and durations, are a recognisable feature of contemporary western societies. Hence, Parekh's conclusion that while there is not a decisive case against polygamy, it ought not to be allowed,

rests on the failure of polygamy to meet the ideals of a gender-egalitarian monogamy not current western practice. This seems to be a case of double standards, for there is no suggestion that any of the varieties of multiple partnering that are practised in the west should be outlawed. Parekh is strong in outlining the value of monogamy, less persuasive in showing that it is a 'deeply valued liberal practice' which requires the outlawing of polygamy (ibid., 288). This is perhaps no more than an indication of how difficult these issues are and of Parekh's determination to explore them.

The minoritisation of religion

Parekh offers one of the most robust normative arguments in the literature on multiculturalism for the public role of religion. He rightly dismisses 'strong secularism' (political debate and deliberation should be conducted in terms of secular reasons alone) but I am not sure that his argument is valid. He says that citizens who pass a law for religious reasons are not thereby imposing any religious beliefs on fellow citizens—who may simply choose to obey the law out of a simple secular duty to respect the authority of the law and ignore the religious motivation (Parekh 2000, 322). But this introduces a dichotomy—the law and its cultural basis—that surely multiculturalists want to bridge. They want to argue that it is because the law draws its legitimacy from the majority culture, it potentially turns minorities into second-class citizens: people who obey the law without being culturally in sympathy with it (persons who in obeying the law may experience 'moral incoherence and self-alienation': ibid., 323). After all, if there is a simple duty to respect the authority of the law, minorities do not need to be given a further reason; they do not need 'recognition' or cultural inclusion. The justification for the partial religious character of the legal and public order is that such orders cannot be culturally neutral. The secularist claim to limit even-handedly the public scope of all religions amounts to a cultural bias against those religions which want to be public players. So, institutionalising some public space for religious groups in a broadly secular framework (what Parekh calls 'weak secularism') is the appropriate multicultural compromise (Modood 1998).

I am also not happy with his suggestion that the west encourages groups to dress up their cultural claims as religious ones and that given the relatively non-negotiable character of religion (more than race?), this sometimes leads to unnecessary political conflict. Despite the fact that an example he cites is the status of the Sikh turban, the sequence of politicisation he describes does not the fit the British case. In Britain, religion was

deliberately left out of the Race Relations Act 1976, an omission that has still not been rectified and the Sikh turban has only come to have a protected status thorough the backdoor of *ethnicity*; it rests on the House of Lords' legal decision that the Sikhs are not merely a religious but also an ethnic group. It is true that religious identity claims have been encouraged by the present climate, but that is not instead of cultural identity claims. Indeed, a detailed look at the development of minority–majority relations in Britain will show that it was race- and ethnicity-based claims that established the initial and greater legitimacy with religious claims following on the coat tails of the former. It also has to be said that Parekh's political analysis here sits oddly with his more theoretical contention that culture tends to be closely connected to religion (Parekh 2000, 146).

The place of religion in multiculturalism is an extremely neglected topic and so Spinner-Halev is to be commended to devoting a book to aspects of it. It is, however, as he acknowledges, a very American book. There is much discussion of real cases but it all relates to the United States; the key religious groups he is interested in are Protestant fundamentalists, orthodox Catholics and Hasidic Jews, predominantly, though not exclusively, white; there is no discussion of Muslims. Moreover, it assumes a liberal problematic (how is a liberal society to accommodate non-liberals) and that the answer lies within liberalism, though his task is to show that liberalism can be more inclusive than liberal theorists allow. Nevertheless, it has something to offer to non-Americans. In many ways this lies in its description of contemporary social dynamics.

Some multiculturalists have a tendency to assume that western societies consist of minorities pitted against conservative or nationalistic majorities. Spinner-Halev asks us to consider whether it may not be more realistic today that in the United States and elsewhere we have a liberal mainstream and marginalised conservative religious minorities. While to some extent this is merely the liberal problematic writ large, it contains an important insight. This is that while majority cultures are not homogeneous, there is indeed a growing mainstream that cuts across ethnicity and has an inclusive dynamic. This mainstream is individualistic, consumerist, materialist and hedonistic and is shaped by a globalising political economy, the media and commercialised popular culture. This allows it to be pluralistic in terms of accommodating 'niche markets', 'lifestyle choices' and 'sub-cultures', especially if they are ephemeral and can contribute to a smorgasbord of 'mix and match'. What it cannot accommodate so easily are minorities who *as groups* are rejected by or

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reject significant parts of this individualistically diverse mainstream. They don't 'fit' because of their group characteristics but are not necessarily ethnic minorities. They may have been, and in some ways may continue to be, racially subordinated but the liberal dynamic breaks down some of these divisions. In fact black people, with their physical prowess, music and style, may even become emblematic of the new diversity. The groups that are likely to (continue to) experience themselves as minorities are those that are opposed to this liberal hedonism, that try to live by rules that do not allow their young to taste the smorgasbord freely. They represent an alternative, less respected, culture; they are most likely to be organised around a religion and to persist where they have the kind of tight rearing, family and community structures associated with conservative religious groups.

Even if this contrast between liberal mainstream and conservative minorities is too simplistic, Spinner-Halev is able to draw an important implication. This is that members of the latter cannot be characterised as lacking autonomy or 'knowing no better'. He points out that no one in the United States can be said to be unaware of the existence or the temptations of liberal lifestyles. 'The lure of mainstream society is relentless. Living a restricted life takes a depth of commitment, is a matter of constant choice, and, at least sometimes, takes character' (Spinner-Halev 2000, 5). Just because one does not choose individuality does not mean that one is more passive than those shaped by the mainstream.

Spinner-Halev makes the further sociological point that some advocates of diversity are naïve about the conditions in which it flourishes and their advocacy may be reducing not enlarging diversity. Two of the main sources of 'minority' formations are exclusion by the majority and internal norms, structures and relationships that differentiate and separate a group from others, especially the dominant group. If the hopes of liberals and egalitarians are realised, then there will be no externally imposed separation. More-over, there will be considerable restrictions in the forms of authority and hierarchy that minorities can perpetuate, as they are required to adjust themselves to liberal and/or egalitarian norms, for example, in relation to gender roles. Identity theorists speak a language of collectivism but do not appreciate that 'if we recognise groups in order to end oppression, group differences will fade in a society where equality reigns. When group boundaries are opaque and shifting, when people are members of different groups, when equality is realized and society's main institutions are inclusive, the individual becomes primary and the group secondary' (Spinner-Halev 2000, 44).

On the basis of these insights, he offers a set of normative principles. I have only space here to mention his key normative point and to query one other principle. His central point is that liberals are right to insist that autonomy is the ultimate political value but wrong to require all communities to put a high value on autonomy (Spinner-Halev 2000, 47). Commitment to a life of restriction and obedience can be worthwhile and ought not to be impeded as long as it is freely chosen, and this last condition is met by the presence of a powerful, welcoming mainstream. The latter ensures that those who choose to stay outside or enter into it on their own terms are doing so in the full knowledge, repeatedly reinforced, that there is an alternative available for them.

Spinner-Halev goes on to offer an interesting discussion of how conservative religious groups can be accommodated in different institutional contexts. He fully appreciates that in the last few decades US courts, guided by academic liberalism, have made some perverse interpretations of the First Amendment (the 'no Establishment clause'), so that American jurisprudence on this subject is a mess. Yet at the end of this discussion he argues that religious people should never be made a special case. For '[t]reating the religious to exemptions from the law that are denied the nonreligious would be giving a certain class of people more rights than others' (Spinner-Halev 2000, 208). His solution is that whenever there is an accommodation of religion, the benefit that accrues to religious people should be made available to everyone. So suppose that employers and schools are required to adjust dress requirements to allow Sikh men to wear the turban, then a corresponding dispensation should be made available to all other employees and students. While this is a well-meaning attempt to maintain the 'universality' of public rules and the law, it seems misguided. First, his solution fails to show that religious people are not being treated specially. After all, the head-dress rule change only occurs because a religious group requires it; so, whatever the scope of the rule change, its motive is respect for religion. Secondly, what is it for non-Sikhs to be offered the same as the Sikhs here? Spinner-Halev wants fellow employees to be allowed to wear the head-dress of their choice. But that is not what Sikhs are being granted. They are being granted the right to wear religiously required head-dress, not any other head-dress. 'Because it is required/prohibited by my religion' has a special normative force that obliges us to accommodate it in the way we would not if someone said 'because I want to'. If we cannot see this then we do not have a principled reason to accommodate the Sikh turban in the first place and Spinner-Halev's dilemma does not arise.

Liberal philosophies and liberal practice

Spinner-Halev's approach offers an opportunity to consider to what extent Parekh's approach departs from liberalism. Spinner-Halev is conscious not just of proper limits to institutionalised cultural hegemony but that something would be lost if certain ways of life—which may not be his—were to be squeezed out. Moreover, he is conscious that the existence of non-liberal cultures is a corrective to the excesses of liberal culture and so is a potential resource for those beyond their membership. Yet these values are not derived from liberalism and so are left ungrounded. Parekh has a much broader philosophical vision of equality as difference and not just of equality as sameness and seems more readily to sanction institutional departures from liberal norms. As his dialogical multiculturalism, however, seems to presuppose and build on an already existing liberal culture and institutional infrastructure it is difficult to judge to what extent it is 'beyond' liberalism and to what extent, especially in practice, it is a more open liberalism.

Parekh would insist that to call a whole culture or society 'liberal' is too simplistic, for not only does every society have some liberal elements—where individual choice is given relatively free rein—but no society is only liberal. This is not simply because it contains non-liberal groups but because liberals cannot be liberal all the time. There are aspects of everyone's lives that cannot be properly analysed in liberal terms. We do not choose our family, community, language, country and so on, yet these constitute our personality and can be the source of obligations which we may or may not have chosen if we could have invented ourselves. Spinner-Havel makes a similar point but does not conclude that the term 'liberal society' is therefore a misnomer. A society cannot be reduced to a single set of principles but surely it is not an error to characterise it in terms of core or distinctive characteristics as long as the analysis is empirically grounded and not abstractly constructed.

This is what Adrian Favell does. His book on 'actually existing liberalism' argues that the way France and Britain have managed immigration and integration are based on their respective national 'philosophies' and demonstrates that liberalism can take different, incompatible forms and which do not bear any resemblance to American theorising. The contrast is of a 'France emphasising the universalist idea of integration, of transforming immigrants into full French *citoyens*; Britain seeing integration as a question of managing public order and relations between majority and minority populations, and allowing ethnic cultures and practices to

mediate the process' (Favell 2001, 4). Using the concept of path dependency, Favell argues that each approach is imprisoned by its presuppositions and so produces 'pathologies' with which it is unable to deal. The British approach, based on diffusing colour racism and meeting post-imperial obligations is, for example, unsuited for dealing with the demands of Muslims and of refugees and asylum seekers who are not 'coloured' or have no historical connections with this country. What is missing in the French intellectual project of 'universalism in one country' and the British 'multiculturalism in one country' is a universal standard of rights and policies that can be harmonised across Europe, for a common European policy can no longer be avoided. For him, the fact that the British understanding of unity and plurality is distinctive has itself become a pathology (Favell 2001, 201).

Favell's is in many ways an excellent analysis that takes national political culture seriously and throws new light on immigration and 'race' in Britain and France, making each country illuminating to itself as well as to the other. In his Europeanist solution to national pathologies, however, sober analysis gives way to wishful thinking. He dismisses the idea of change/progress as internal and organic as a self-flattering British myth even though the motor of change in Britain is mainly our own debates. Two of the most recent reports (Macpherson 1999 and Commission on the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain 2000, the latter chaired by Parekh) are creative yet distinctly British. While not narrowly national, they owe little to mainland European thinking or practice. Similarly, despite his gloss, the ethnic minority social and political advances to which Favell points rarely have anything to do with European institutions. The future may be European but not because we cannot diagnose and cure our own pathologies. We would do well to prepare for European infections as well as medicine.

The question of empirical fit can be raised with Parekh, too. He offers a philosophical perspective within which to approach the practical issues of multiculturalism but it is not obvious that one of his major foci of interest, the post-immigration multiculturalism in western Europe, sits squarely within this perspective. As the second and third generations become the majority within their groups, these may depart from being 'organised communities entertaining and living by their own different systems of beliefs and practices' (Parekh 2000, 3). There are at the moment at least two simultaneous trends: the development of hybridic lifestyles and hyphenated identities that approximate more to what Parekh understands as sub-cultures than cultures; and the development of ethno-religious communities (Modood 1998). This suggests that Spinner-Halev's model of 'liberal mainstream and

conservative religious minorities' may turn out to have more relevance, when integrated with analyses of ethnicity and racism, than 'dialogue amongst diverse cultures'. Such minorities are, of course, likely to feel besieged and this is unlikely to create the conditions of a dialogue amongst equals.

Parekh's philosophy may turn out, however, to have more relevance at a global level, offering a basis for what some call a 'dialogue of civilisations'. In any case, his political philosophy is so exceedingly flexible, with its emphasis on culturally mediated interpretations of all universal principles, on asymmetry between citizens and between federal units and an open-ended dialogue that, for all its brilliance and empathy, it leaves unclear as to what exactly it implies in a particular situation and when it is and is not being applied. Perhaps that is the nature of all argument. Certainly, Parekh's book is a major contribution that advances our thinking on all these issues; agree or disagree with him, all will appreciate his clarity and penetration.

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