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Nasar Meer & Tariq Modood
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Refutations of racism in the ‘Muslim question’

NASAR MEER AND TARIQ MODOOD

ABSTRACT Meer and Modood identify a variety of reasons why the notion that Muslim minorities could be subject to racism by virtue of their real or perceived ‘Muslimness’ is met with much less sympathy than the widely accepted notion that other religious minorities in Europe, particularly Jewish groups, can be the victims of racism. They begin by elaborating the relationships between Islamophobia, anti-Muslim sentiment and cultural racism, before turning to the results of interviews with journalists who make allegedly formative contributions to our understanding of anti-Muslim sentiment. Meer and Modood delineate and discuss four tendencies. The first is the conceptualization of racism that assumes that the protections afforded to racial minorities conventionally conceived as involuntarily constituted should not be extended to Muslims because theirs is a religious identity that is voluntarily chosen. The second is that the way that religion per se is frowned upon by the contemporary intelligentsia invites the ridiculing of Muslims as being salutary for intellectual debate and not, therefore, an issue of discrimination. Third, while ethnic identities are welcomed in the public space, there is much more unease about religious minorities. Finally, some find it difficult to sympathize with a minority that is perceived to be disloyal or associated with terrorism, a view that leads to a perception of Muslims as a threat rather than as a disadvantaged minority, subject to increasingly pernicious discourses of racialization. Each of these tendencies could benefit from further study, underscoring the need for a greater exploration of anti-Muslim discourse.

KEYWORDS anti-Muslim prejudice, antisemitism, Islam, Islamophobia, Muslims, race, racism

I believe we can learn a lot from the history of the Jews of Europe. In many ways they are the first, the oldest Europeans. We, the new Europeans, are just starting to learn the complex art of living with multiple allegiances . . . The Jews have been forced to master this art since antiquity. They were both Jewish and Italian, or Jewish and French, Jewish and Spanish, Jewish and Polish, Jewish and German. Proud of their ties with Jewish communities throughout the continent, and equally proud of their bonds with their own country.

—Romano Prodi

In marked contrast to the once seemingly intractable ‘Jewish question’ that haunted the continent of Europe throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that periodically facilitated episodes of persecution and genocide, there is evidence to suggest that the contemporary representation of Jewish minorities within European public discourses has undergone a process of ‘normalization’. The affirmations of Romano Prodi, former president of the European Commission, made during his tenure and elaborated above, perhaps exemplify ‘the ways in which leaders today champion the preservation... of Europe’s Jewish communities’. And it comes as some relief to learn that ‘no European party of any significance and this includes the various extreme right-wing movements on the continent, currently champions a specifically anti-Semitic agenda’. An optimistic interpretation of this state of affairs would be to posit the existence of something like a mainstream consensus on the current unacceptability of public articulations of antisemitism.

Of course, this should not be read as suggesting that European societies are free from antisemitism in all its guises. Even in Britain, where far-right political parties have never flourished as they have on the continent, partly due to an electoral system that squeezes out smaller parties, survey evidence compiled by Clive Field in 2006 shows that hostility to British Jews continues to exist and often stems from the view that ‘the loyalty of British Jews to

4 Ibid. The same cannot be said of these European parties’ attitudes to Muslims in Europe. See, for example, statements issued by the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO) on the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EU; the Belgian Vlaams Belang’s comment that ‘Islam is now the no. 1 enemy not only of Europe but of the world’; and the Front National (FN) literature on the ‘Islamization of France’: see Bunzl, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, 1–47. Parallels can be found in the leading (but much less mainstream) far-right party in Britain, the British National Party (BNP), which frequently campaigns on what it describes as ‘the Muslim problem’: see Nasar Meer, ‘Less equal than others’, Index on Censorship, vol. 36, no. 2, 2007, 114–18. For examples of less flagrant, more coded, but equally alarming comments made by British politicians and intellectuals, see Nasar Meer, ‘“Get off your knees!” Print media public intellectuals and Muslims in Britain’, Journalism Studies, vol. 7, 2006, 35–59; Nasar Meer, ‘The politics of voluntary and involuntary identities: are Muslims in Britain an ethnic, racial or religious minority?’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 42, no. 1, 2008, 61–81; and Nasar Meer and Tehseen Noorani, ‘A sociological comparison of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain’, Sociological Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2008, 195–219.
5 Esther Benbassa, ‘Xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and racism: Europe’s recurring evils?’, in Bunzl, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.
Israel transcends their allegiance to Britain. Such findings may be added to others in support of the view that Britain is experiencing a resurgence of antisemitism. This is a concern that has resulted in a report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Anti-Semitism (2006) that has been taken up in public and media discussions incorporating the concerns of some leading Jewish spokespeople and intellectuals. What appears to have gone unnoticed, however, is that a number of surveys have consistently found that

Islamophobic views in Britain would appear easily to outstrip anti-Semitic sentiments in terms of frequency (more than double the size of the hard core), intensity and overtness . . . somewhere between one in five and one in four Britons now exhibits a strong dislike of, and prejudice against, Islam and Muslims . . .

While quantitative surveys do not always provide the best accounts of prejudice and discrimination, they can be useful in discerning trends, alerting us in this case to the widespread prevalence of an anti-Muslim feeling. Indeed, recent large-scale comparative studies conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that one in four Britons expressed attitudinal hostility to Muslims. What makes this more alarming, however,

8 For example, the Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 547 antisemitic incidents during 2007, the second highest annual total since it began monitoring antisemitic incidents in 1984. These incidents included cases of extreme violence, assault, damage and desecration of property, threats and abusive behaviour. CST, Antisemitic Incidents Report 2007 (London: CST 2008), available on the CST website at www.thecst.org.uk/docs/Incidents%5FReport%5F07.pdf (viewed 16 April 2009).
10 Field, ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain’, 465 (for a detailed list of surveys, see Appendix I, 472–5).
11 For example, in the first two weeks after the London bombings of 7/7, the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), a charity that is comparable to the CST, registered over 200 incidents. These included sixty-five cases of violent physical attacks and criminal damage, and one fatal stabbing in which the victim was accosted by attackers shouting ‘Taliban’. IHRC, ‘Enormous upsurge in anti-Muslim backlash’ (press release), 22 July 2005, available on the IHRC website at www.ihrc.org (viewed 16 April 2009).
is that such findings are frequently met with derision by otherwise self-avowedly anti-racist intellectuals or politicians who either remain sceptical of the scale of the problem, or, indeed, of its racial content altogether. This means that, while Muslims are increasingly the subject of hostility and discrimination, as well as governmental racial profiling and surveillance, and targeting by intelligence agencies, their status as victims of racism is frequently challenged or denied. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that, instead of highlighting and alleviating anti-Muslim discrimination,


15 See, for example, calls from the outgoing head of MI5, Dame Eliza Mannigham-Buller, for the police to develop a network of Muslim spies who could provide intelligence on their co-religionists: Richard Ford and Michael Evans, ‘Recruit Muslim spies in war on terror, urges new security chief’, The Times, 9 July 2007. This suggestion followed the disclosure that a number of British intelligence agencies had monitored over 100,000 British Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca (see David Leppard, ‘Terror watch on Mecca pilgrims’, The Times, 21 January 2007), and that there had been an unpopular attempt by the Department of Education to encourage universities to report ‘Asian-looking’ students suspected of involvement in ‘Islamic political radicalism’ (see Vikram Dodd, ‘Universities urged to spy on Muslims’, Guardian, 16 October 2006). This is compounded by the astonishing number of instances of the ‘stop and search’ of ‘Asians’ (categorization by religion is not used for instances of ‘stop and search’), which, between 2001 and 2002, increased in London by 41 per cent: Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), Report of the MPA Scrutiny on MPS Stop and Search Practice (London: MPA 2004), 21, available on the MPA website at http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/issues/stop-search/stop-search-report-2004.pdf (viewed 16 April 2009). The national figures point to a 25 per cent increase in the ‘stop and search’ of people self-defining as ‘Other’: Home Office, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System—2005: A Home Office Publication under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (London: Home Office 2006), 24, available on the Home Office website at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/s95race05.pdf (viewed 16 April 2009). (The category ‘Other’ can include Muslims of Turkish, Arabic or North African ethnic origin, among others; while 68 per cent of the British Muslim population have a South Asian background, the remaining minority are comprised of several ‘Other’ categories.) These examples would seem to support Junaid Rana’s conclusion that ‘current practices of racial profiling in the War on Terror perpetuate a logic that demands the ability to define what a Muslim looks like from appearance and visual cues. This is not based purely on superficial cultural markers such as religious practice, clothing, language, and identification. A notion of race is at work in the profiling of Muslims’: Junaid Rana, ‘The story of Islamophobia’, Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society, vol. 9, no. 2, 2007, 148–62 (149).
the complaint of anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia has, conversely and frequently, invited criticism of Muslims themselves.¹⁶

In this article we explore some of the reasons why there may be less sympathy for the notion that Muslim minorities might be subject to racism by virtue of their real or perceived ‘Muslimness’ than there is, rightly, for the idea that Jewish minorities in Europe might be the object of racism by virtue of their real or perceived ‘Jewishness’. Or, more precisely, that ‘a form of hostility towards Jews as Jews’¹⁷ might be paralleled by a form of hostility towards Muslims as Muslims. This parallel is something that goes beyond similarities in negative stereotyping, however, for, as Geoffrey Levey and Tariq Modood insist, the analogy lies in the way in which anti-Muslim sentiment, like antisemitism, ‘trades on and reinforces prejudice … via a process of induction and a process of deduction’.¹⁸ These authors draw on the thinking of Brian Klug to help capture an operative understanding of antisemitism,¹⁹ and to extend its logic to an understanding of anti-Muslim sentiment, one that describes a ‘shift from inductive to deductive negative generalisations’. Where ‘inductive negative stereotyping can be seen clearly in the security policies of “racial profiling”, [in which] security services concentrate their attention on people who look or behave a certain way based on the activities of Islamists’,²⁰ this can crystallize into negative deductions about Muslims that are then applied to Muslims in general. This process can also work in the other direction, and so can alternate, but is either way mutually reinforcing. This is elaborated in the following conceptual section. Thereafter, we draw on primary interviews with journalists to expand on this understanding, before concluding that, taken together, our data are instructive in illustrating how an anxiety over the ‘Muslim question’ informs the hesitancy to name anti-Muslim sentiment as racism.

¹⁶ See Meer, ‘The politics of voluntary and involuntary identities; Meer, ‘Less equal than others’; and Meer, ““Get off your knees!””.
¹⁹ Klug offers the following: ‘The logic of anti-Semitism does not work like this: “The Rothschilds are powerful and exploitive, hence Jews in general are.” But more like this: “Jews are powerful and exploitive, just look at the Rothschilds.” In other words, anti-Semites do not generalize from instances. They are disposed to see Jews in a certain negative light, which is why I call their prejudice “a priori”’; Brian Klug, ‘Anti-Semitism—new or old?’, The Nation, 12 April 2004, 20 (Letters).
²⁰ Levey and Modood, ‘Liberal democracy, multicultural citizenship and the Danish cartoon affair’, 239.
Islamophobia, anti-Muslim sentiment and cultural racism

One of the things that has bedevilled an informed discussion of anti-Muslim discourse has been the debate over terminology. Perhaps the best illustration of this is the term ‘Islamophobia’, which, while ‘emerging as a neologism in the 1970s’, became increasingly salient during the 1980s and 1990s, and arguably reached public policy prominence with the report by the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI) entitled Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (1997). The introduction of the term was justified by the report’s assessment that ‘anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed’. ‘Islamophobia’ was defined by the CBMI as ‘an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’, and further elaborated by the proposal of eight possible Islamophobic mindsets. This, of course, was before global events had elevated the issue to a level previously only hinted at, resulting in a reconvening of the CBMI that heard testimony from leading Muslim spokespeople that ‘there is not a day that we do not have to face comments so ignorant that even Enoch Powell would not have made them’.

We may all be guilty of sometimes spending ‘far too much time deconstructing the key terms of social debate and far too little time analysing how they function’. Indeed, such an exercise here could be instructive, not least because one of the difficulties with how the CBMI conceived of Islamophobia stems from the notion of an ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’. Such a notion clearly entails the interpretative task of establishing hostility as

24 Ibid. The eight statements are: 1) Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change. 2) Islam is seen as separate and ‘other’. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them. 3) Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist. 4) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a ‘clash of civilizations’. 5) Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used for political or military advantage. 6) Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out of hand. 7) Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society. 8) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal.
'founded' or 'unfounded'. Furthermore, what the CBMI was perhaps naive in not anticipating was how the term would also be politically criticized for, among other things, allegedly reinforcing ‘a monolithic concept of Islam, Islamic cultures, Muslims and Islamism, involving ethnic, cultural, linguistic, historical and doctrinal differences while affording vocal Muslims a ready concept of victimology’. For other critics, by conceiving of discrimination as a collection of pathological beliefs (also implied by use of the term ‘phobia’), the term neglected ‘the active and aggressive part of discrimination’. An additional complaint was that the term did not adequately account for the nature of the prejudice directed at Muslims. This was advanced by Fred Halliday, whose thesis is worth examining because it accepts that Muslims experience direct discrimination as Muslims. Halliday nevertheless considers the term ‘Islamophobia’ misleading:

It misses the point about what it is that is being attacked: ‘Islam’ as a religion was the enemy in the past: in the crusades or the reconquista. It is not the enemy now . . . The attack now is not against Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term.

So, in contrast to the thrust of the Islamophobia concept, as he understands it, the stereotypical enemy ‘is not a faith or a culture, but a people’ who form the ‘real’ targets of prejudice. While Halliday’s critique is richer than many others, particularly journalistic accounts such as those discussed elsewhere, what it ignores is how the majority of Muslims who report experiencing street-level discrimination recount—as testimonies to the

27 For example, does hostility to all religion ipso facto make one an Islamophobe?
31 Ibid., 898 (emphasis in the original).
32 See Meer, ‘“Get off your knees!”’; Meer, ‘Less equal than others’; Meer, ‘The politics of voluntary and involuntary identities’; and Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, ‘The multicultural state we’re in: Muslims, “multiculture”, and the “civic re-balancing” of British multiculturalism’, Political Studies (forthcoming). See also Malik, ‘Are Muslims hated?’: in this television documentary, Malik argued that ‘the Islamic Human Rights Commission monitored just 344 Islamophobic attacks in the 12 months following 9/11—most of which were minor incidents like shoving or spitting. That’s 344 too many—but it’s hardly a climate of uncontrolled hostility towards Muslims. . . . It’s not Islamophobia, but the perception that it blights Muslim lives, that creates anger and resentment. That’s why it’s dangerous to exaggerate the hatred of Muslims. Even more worrying is the way that the threat of Islamophobia is now being used to stifle
Runnymede’s 2004 follow-up Commission bear witness—that they do so when they appear ‘conspicuously Muslim’ more than when they do not. Since this can result from wearing Islamic attire, it becomes irrelevant—if it is even possible—to separate the impact of appearing Muslim from the impact of appearing to follow Islam. For example, the increase in personal abuse and everyday racism since 9/11 and 7/7 in which the perceived ‘Islamicness’ of the victims is the central reason for abuse—regardless of the validity of this presumption, to the point that Sikhs and others with an ‘Arab’ appearance have been attacked for ‘looking like bin Laden’—suggests that discrimination and/or hostility to Islam and Muslims are much more interlinked than Halliday’s thesis allows.33

One illustration of this may be found in the summary report on Islamophobia published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia shortly after 9/11. This indicated a rise in the number of ‘physical and verbal threats being made, particularly to those visually identifiable as Muslims, in particular women wearing the hijab’.34 Despite variations in the number and correlation of physical and verbal threats directed at Muslim populations among the individual nation–states, one overarching feature that emerged in all the fifteen European Union countries was the tendency for Muslim women to be attacked because the hijab signified an Islamic identity.35 The overlapping and interacting nature of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice directed at Muslims can be further demonstrated in the attitudes revealed in opinion polls of non-Muslim Britons one year after 9/11. These showed that

criticism of Islam.’ Malik is not alone in holding this view and there are several problematic issues that arise in his analysis that may also be evident elsewhere (see Joppke, ‘Limits of integration policy’, and Hansen, ‘The Danish cartoon controversy’). For example, it is easy to complain that Muslims exaggerate Islamophobia without noting that they are no more likely to do so than others who might exaggerate colour-racism, antisemitism, sexism, ageism, homophobia or many other forms of discrimination. That is, his claim remains a political rather than a reasonably informed empirical one. Second, and more important, Malik limits Islamophobia to violent attacks and ignores its discursive character in prejudicing, stereotyping, direct and indirect discrimination, exclusion from networks and so on, and the many non-physical ways in which discrimination operates. Third, Malik draws on data gathered prior to the events of 7/7; according to the same source (the Islamic Human Rights Commission) and using the same indices, the number of incidents radically increased in the first two weeks after the bombings (see note 11).

33 In all fairness to Halliday, this may not easily have been anticipated in 1999, when his ‘‘Islamophobia’ reconsidered’ was published.
35 Ibid., 35.
there could be little doubt from G-2002 that 9/11 had taken some toll. Views of Islam since 9/11 were more negative for 47%, and of Britain’s Muslims for 35% (almost three times the first post-9/11 figure in G-2001f. Dislike for Islam was expressed by 36%, three in four of whom were fearful of what it might do in the next few years. One quarter rejected the suggestion that Islam was mainly a peaceful religion, with terrorists comprising only a tiny minority . . .

What these examples make manifest are the confusions contained within the references presently being used to racial and religious antipathy towards Muslims and Islam. Yet this is not unique to the conceptualization of anti-Muslim sentiment, as debates concerning racism and antisemitism demonstrate. This is illustrated in Modood’s description of antisemitism as ‘a form of religious persecution [which] became, over a long, complicated, evolving but contingent history, not just a form of cultural racism but one with highly systematic biological formulations’. He continues:

Centuries before those modern ideas we have come to call ‘racism’ . . . the move from religious antipathy to racism may perhaps be witnessed in post-Reconquista Spain when Jews and Muslims were forced to convert to Christianity or be expelled. At this stage, the oppression can perhaps be characterised as religious. Soon afterward, converted Jews and Muslims and their offspring began to be suspected of not being true Christian believers, a doctrine developed amongst some Spaniards that this was because their old religion was in their blood. In short, because of their biology, conversion was impossible. Centuries later, these views about race became quite detached from religion and in Nazi and related doctrines were given a thoroughly scientific-biologic cast and constitute a paradigmatic and extreme version of modern racism.

This should not be read as an endorsement of the view that all racism can be reduced to a biological racism. Indeed, in the example above, modern

38 Field, ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain’, 455.
39 Meer and Noorani, ‘A sociological comparison of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain’.
biological racism has some roots in pre-modern religious antipathy, an argument that is also made by Junaid Rana. As such, we should guard against the characterization of racism as a form of ‘inherentism’ or ‘biological determinism’, which leaves little space to conceive the ways in which cultural racism draws on physical appearance as one marker, among others, but is not solely premised on conceptions of biology in a way that ignores religion, culture and so forth. Accordingly, we proceed with the view that terms such as ‘anti-Muslim sentiment’ and ‘Islamophobia’ should nest within concepts of cultural racism and racialization. This is because neat and categorical delineations within terminology are made implausible by variations in the social phenomena that they seek to describe and understand, so that a more nimble and absorbent nomenclature is preferred.

**Media discourse**

While these theoretical linkages illustrate how Islamophobia as anti-Muslim sentiment can constitute a form of racism, the discussion thus far has not offered an explanation as to how and why it may be deemed less problematic than other forms of racism. Contrasting perceptions of anti-Muslim sentiment with antisemitism may, once more, provide a fruitful line of enquiry, for the reasons that Claudes Moraes MEP gives.

The media and Islamphobia are two of the most potent combinations of recent times. … You see antisemitism is loaded with a very heightened awareness … that creates a situation which is very emotive and rightly so. With Islam the difference is that there isn’t that historical baggage. The media are not identifying a group of people and saying that this is what they suffered. … There’s also a sense of confusion about Islam versus cult-like behaviour because there hasn’t been a very good analysis in the media and popular culture generally (interview with Nasar Meer, 3 January 2008).

To explore these issues we turn our attention to some journalists who make these allegedly formative contributions to our understanding of anti-Muslim sentiment. We detail in depth data from interviews in Britain with

41 Rana, ‘The story of Islamophobia’.
42 As should antisemitism, though this is not the primary focus of this article.
43 For a fuller discussion of the role of journalists, see Meer, “‘Get off your knees!’”. The _Guardian_ is probably the only national newspaper in which the issue of anti-Muslim sentiment is taken seriously. Yet even here prevailing opinions are clearly divided among its columnists, with Madeline Bunting, Gary Young, Seamus Milne and Jonathan Freedland considering it to be an issue of real concern, and Polly Toynbee, Catherine Bennett and Timothy Garton Ash, among others, considering it to be much less so. This is in contrast to its sister paper, the _Observer_, particularly in the writings of Will Hutton and Nick Cohen, who view it as a misconception.
one senior home affairs broadcast journalist and three senior newspaper commissioning editors (two broadsheets and one tabloid).  

**A narrow view of racism**

Our data suggest that one of the explanations for the ambivalence towards attributions of anti-Muslim sentiment reflects a commonly held, narrow definition of racism that assumes that the discrimination directed at conventionally, involuntarily, conceived racial minorities cannot by definition resemble that directed at Muslim minorities. This reckoning is premised on the assumption that Muslim identities are religious identities that are voluntarily chosen. So it is frequently stated that, while gendered, racial and sexual identities are ascribed or involuntary categories of birth, being a Muslim is about chosen beliefs, and that Muslims therefore need or ought to have less legal protection than these other kinds of identities. What this ignores, however, is that people do not choose to be or not to be born into a Muslim family. Similarly, no one chooses to be born into a society in which to look like a Muslim or to be a Muslim creates suspicion, hostility or failure to get the job they applied for. One frequent reaction to this complaint, however, is the charge that Muslim minorities are quick to adopt a ‘victim mentality’. These two separate but interlinked issues are illustrated in the following comments of a senior journalist with editorial and commissioning responsibilities at a centre-right national broadsheet newspaper:

> It [Islamophobia] doesn’t mean anything to me. No, it’s a device or a construct that’s been used to cover an awful lot of people and censor debate . . . The racism

44 This research was funded by the European Commission and forms part of EMILIE: A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship: Legal Political and Educational Challenges, Contract no. CIT5-CT-2005-02820.


46 For example, Polly Toynbee, writing in the *Guardian*, has stated that she reserves the ‘right’ to offend religious minorities on matters of faith because ‘race is something people cannot choose and it defines nothing about them as people. But beliefs are what people choose to identify with . . . The two cannot be blurred into one which is why the word Islamophobia is a nonsense’ (Toynbee, ‘My right to offend a fool’). Elsewhere she has proclaimed: ‘I am an Islamophobe and proud of it!’ (Toynbee, ‘In defence of Islamophobia’).

47 Of course, how Muslims respond to these circumstances will vary. Some will organize resistance, while others will try to stop looking like Muslims (the equivalent of ‘passing’ for white); some will build an ideology out of their subordination, others will not, just as a woman can choose to be a feminist or not. Again, some Muslims may define their Islam in terms of piety rather than politics; just as some women may see no politics in their gender, while for others their gender will be at the centre of their politics.
thing is a bit difficult to sustain because we are talking about a religion here, not race and you have plenty of people who are not Muslim, if you are trying to equate Muslims with South Asians, obviously that’s not necessarily the case at all (interview with Nasar Meer, 22 January 2008).

This extract conveys the view that the term ‘Islamophobia’ is used politically to silence potential criticism of Islam and Muslims, and is particularly invalid because racism is only plausible in relation to ethnic groups, not ethnically heterogeneous religious groups. The journalist continues:

I think I probably went to the first press conference where the phrase came up, I think it was about five or six years ago … Since we were the ones that were being accused of it, it just seemed rather difficult for me to get my head around, because if Islamophobia means a fear of, literally, that was not what we were talking about. We were talking about fear of terrorists who act in the name of Islam; it’s a different thing altogether.

The first sentence of this extract locates this journalist’s first interaction with the term, and their sense of grievance in ‘being accused of it’, while the second sentence returns us to Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak’s criticism, outlined earlier, as well as rehearsing some of charges put forward by Fred Halliday. The last sentence, which focuses on terrorism, is particularly instructive and will be addressed separately below.

In the meantime this characterization of Islamophobia may be contrasted with another that emerges in the less definitive account of a senior broadcast news editor with responsibilities across the whole range of broadcast, internet and radio journalism. This journalist expresses a similar anxiety to that of the previous respondent, in reconciling what they consider to be a ‘full and frank’ account with the potential charge of anti-Muslim bias.

There are certainly quite vocal groups of Muslims who are very quick to stress the problems that Muslims can face in this country and work very hard to encourage journalists like me and others to reflect a particular view which might be described as a victim mentality … I am personally not persuaded that it [Islamophobia] is a huge issue in Britain. It is, racism in all its forms is a problem … I think for the most part it’s really a very tolerant country so I’m kind of conscious that we mustn’t allow

48 Writing in the Daily Telegraph, Michael Burleigh has similarly stated: ‘Those claiming to speak for the Muslim community have played to the traditional Left-wing imagination by conjuring up the myth of “far-Right extremism”. In reality, evidence for “Islamophobia” as distinct from a justified fear of radical Islamist terrorism or a desire to protect our freedoms, institutions and values from those who hold them in contempt is anecdotal and slight’: Michael Burleigh, ‘Religious hatred bill is being used to buy Muslim votes’, Daily Telegraph, 9 December 2004.

49 Reisigl and Wodak, Discourse and Discrimination; Halliday, “‘Islamophobia’ reconsidered’.
ourselves for the sake of a good story to start painting a picture of a slice of British society which does suffer more than it really does . . . (interview with Nasar Meer, 3 January 2008).

While the latter half of this passage reveals a critical perspective on the prevalence of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment, it is interesting to note how, in marked contrast to the centre-right national broadsheet journalist, the broadcast journalist comfortably places the issue of Islamophobia alongside issues of racism, which ‘in all its forms is a problem’. This may in part be due to the insistence of the ‘vocal groups of Muslims’ that this respondent refers to, for public broadcasters do have a robust policy of diversity awareness training, but the proactive inclusion of Muslim voices is a moot point (see below for more on this), as is the characterization of Muslim complaints as forming part of an alleged ‘victim mentality’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most Muslim-friendly attitude is to be found in the words of a senior figure at a leading centre-left national newspaper who describes how treating anti-Muslim sentiment with ‘less seriousness’ can bias the framing of news items:

I think it is easy to slip into . . . I saw it the other day, and it was three headlines together on one page of the Daily Telegraph, and the headline said something like ‘Foreigners live in £1.3 million houses’ . . . Then there was a headline where the word Muslim was being used in a pejorative sense and I thought these things, to my mind, are quite dangerous . . . I think that’s where some papers make a really big mistake time after time after time (interview with Nasar Meer, 29 January 2008).

One development that might alleviate this tendency is the greater presence of Muslim journalists working on a range of news items on different newspapers. This is a point that is also raised by a correspondent formerly with a leading national tabloid, who contrasts the public service requirement of broadcasters with the commercial imperatives of newspaper—and particularly tabloid—journalism, which is shaped by an aggressive drive for sales.

Because the way newspapers in particular work, I don’t know that that’s their job to reflect Muslims per se, do you know what I mean? . . . In my time at the [newspaper] I remember the Sun hired a Muslim commentator not long after 9/11, and she did a lot of discussion about whether she was going to wear her veil in the picture. Anila Baig. That was all a bit self-conscious. [We] had a few first-person pieces and features and so on . . . if there was a story that involved Muslim groups being invited to No. 10 then you would call the Muslim group to see how it’d gone but I wouldn’t say it would go any deeper than that. . . . I just report as I do every story. I’m not self-consciously having to check myself or judge myself (interview with Nasar Meer, 18 January 2008).
This extract illustrates the dynamics involved in nurturing ‘Muslim voices’ within newspapers in a way that can draw attention to how issues of importance to some Muslims, such as the wearing of the veil, may be reported in an educative manner. So even though it may be perceived as ‘a bit self-conscious’, it appears much more profound than seeking ‘Muslim comment’ that—by this journalist’s own admission—would not penetrate the framing of a story in much depth. This is then related to the final issue that emerges from this paragraph and that concerning reflexivity in this respondent’s conception of journalism, something that is evidently in stark contrast to our respondent from the leading centre-left national newspaper (though there is also a tabloid/broadsheet distinction here).

**Religion**

The last extract touches on a related issue concerning the ways in which religion *per se* is met with anxiety. One particular implication is that, while curbs on defamation of conventionally conceived ethnic and racial minorities may be seen as progressive, the mocking of Muslims is seen to constitute healthy intellectual debate. This tendency is perhaps heightened when the religion in question takes a conservative line on issues of gender equality, sexual orientation and progressive politics generally, leading some commentators who may otherwise sympathize with Muslim minorities to argue that it is difficult to view Muslims as victims when they may themselves be potential oppressors. As Bhikhu Parekh notes, this can be traced to a perception that Muslims are ‘collectivist, intolerant, authoritarian, illiberal and theocratic’, and that they use their faith as ‘a self-conscious public statement, not quietly held personal faith but a matter of identity which they must jealously guard and loudly and repeatedly proclaim … not only to remind them of who they are but also to announce to others what they stand for’. It is thus unsurprising to learn that some attitude surveys

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50 For a discussion of these sentiments in relation to the Danish cartoon affair, see Modood, ‘Obstacles to multicultural integration’.

51 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Europe, liberalism and the “Muslim question”’, in Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds), *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach* (London: Routledge 2006), 180, 181. This is also supported in survey findings that report anxiety over the intensity of Muslim religiosity. Clive Field notes that ‘in G-2004h [Populus survey for The Times, ‘Political attitudes’, 2–4 April 2004 (n = 1,045)], 70% acknowledged that they seemed to take their faith more seriously than Christians, while in G-2005b [Populus survey for The Times, 15–16 April 2005 (n = 714)], 28% had a concern about the presence of those with strong Muslim beliefs. In G-2005c [Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, ‘Islamic extremism’, conducted 25 April–7 May 2005 by NOP (n = 750)], 80% felt that British Muslims had a keen sense of Islamic identity, which was still growing (63%) and which had to be reckoned as a “bad thing” (56%), with the potential to lead to violence and loss of personal freedoms and to act as a barrier to integration’ (Field, ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain’, 457).
report that 77 per cent of people are convinced that ‘Islam has a lot of
fanatical followers’, 68 per cent consider it ‘to have more to do with the
middle ages than the modern world’, and 64 per cent believe that Islam
‘treats women badly’. These assumptions are present in our broadcast
journalist’s insistence that ‘the nature of the debate is such that some
Muslims most certainly will be offended’.

The recent furore that accompanied the Archbishop of Canterbury’s
lecture on civil and religious laws in England—that touched on the
availability of recourse to aspects of sharia for Muslims who seek it in civil
courts in Britain—provides a good illustration of the implication of this
journalist’s position. Indeed, at the height of the storm, one of the authors
received an email (8 February 2008) from a Daily Mail journalist that stated:
‘I was wondering if you might talk to us about sharia law in the UK, and the
effects it might have on our society. . . . What we do need is someone saying
that Sharia law would not necessarily be a good thing, so if this is not for
you, then don’t worry!’ This sort of approach is anticipated by our
respondent formerly from a leading national tabloid who describes how
the emphasis rests on getting a story into circulation:

If you were being accurate you would be going to communities . . . and speaking to
people. What we tend to do is report what is happening . . . someone from the Beeb
[BBC] might be [going to the communities] if they are doing a story on whether or
not Muslim women should be allowed to wear a veil when they go to see their MP.
I would have talked to Jack Straw and someone from the organization.

The optimism informing the view that it should be left to a public
broadcaster to play the role of an honest broker in reporting emotive stories
concerning Muslims with impartiality is not something justified by our
interview data. Indeed, our senior broadcast journalist considers the
portrayal of difficult stories concerning religious affairs generally, but
particularly stories focusing on Muslims, as constituting a necessary part
of a public conversation that, in the example of the veil, proceeds by
questioning the very legitimacy of the veil itself. As the extract highlights,
this is informed by this journalist’s view that visible markers of difference
and diversity are intrinsically tied to broader, in this view legitimate, public
anxieties over immigration that should not be silenced in the interests of
maintaining what the respondent describes as an artificially harmonious
depiction of multiculturalism:

52 Field, ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain’, 453.
53 See Tariq Modood, ‘Multicultural citizenship and the anti-sharia storm’,
openDemocracy, 14 February 2008, at www.opendemocracy.net/article/faith_ideas/
europe_islam/anti_sharia_storm (viewed 17 April 2009).
54 In another part of the interview the broadcast journalist states: ‘I think the
[broadcaster] has been through an interesting phase which echoes that slight change
It needs to be something that we do discuss and think about and have a national conversation about because from it flows all the other discussion about our expectations of those who come from other countries to live and work here. . . . I’ve talked about the veil endlessly over the last year because I do think it’s been a really interesting one . . . suddenly people began to say, well hold on, is it right that somebody can teach a class full of kids wearing a full veil. And I think it’s a perfectly reasonable question and one that we need to discuss.

In a significant contrast to the public questioning—as an editorial line—of the visibility and indeed legitimacy of religion, our respondent from a leading centre-left national newspaper describes how their paper seeks to incorporate an educational element in its religious coverage. One example may be found in its comment section, which was recently ‘blogging’ the Qu’ran in a serialization penned by a prominent Muslim intellectual. Another example is the appointment of a young Muslim woman as its religious affairs correspondent, which ‘probably raised eyebrows in one or two places’. The journalist continues:

She went on the hajj and did some video for the website, and what I thought was terrific as well, she was able to report pilgrim voices, and these were young British people, they were from the North of England, from London, and so on and so forth, and what the hajj meant to them, what their Muslim identification meant, i.e. voices you don’t normally get in a national newspaper.

While these examples perhaps take us away from a direct discussion of racism and Islamophobia, in the way that was elaborated earlier, it is still worth noting how much importance the paper attributes to the value of embedding plural constituencies within its journalism, perhaps as a prophylactic against unwitting anti-Muslim sentiment. This publication is, then, unique in its approach for not only does it seek to afford space in which to cultivate the representation of religion in public discourse, it does so through a consciously Muslim interlocutor.

that I’ve been talking about in the last few years which is I think there was a belief that we had to promote multiculturalism: that it was our job to try and do lots of stories about how lovely it was to have lots of people from different cultures in Britain and not report too much what tensions there were, certainly not allow the voices of those people who had concerns about the changing nature of their high street or whatever it was. I think that has changed over the last couple of years. I think there has been, quite rightly, a change of view that we do need in the corporation to ensure that we reflect whatever tensions and anxieties and indeed prejudices that may exist within British society and a recognition that for people to question, for instance, the level of immigration into this country is not of itself beyond the pale. That is a legitimate position for someone to hold and, indeed, has become a pretty central political discussion right now.'
**Terrorism and the securitization of ethnic relations**

Other respondents have a very different interest in what Islam means to its British adherents, and place little importance on garnering an empathetic understanding of the spiritual role of religion. Their focus instead appears to be on an assumed relationship between religion and issues of terrorism: issues that are deemed to be especially pertinent in their coverage of Islam and Muslims. As our former tabloid journalist reiterates: ‘there’s a global jihad going on that we’re all involved in ... everything changed after 9/11 and again after 7/7’. This sentiment is repeated by the centre-right national broadsheet journalist who summarizes how 7/7

...was a surprise because what we were looking at in the late 90s and up to 2004 was the belief that it was going to be imported terrorist attacks ... the big surprise was that they were going to attack their own country which was a bit of a turning point I think. It was a bit of an eye-opener.

There is evidence for supposing that this is a widely held view, with Field concluding that, post-7/7, there has been an increased ‘tendency to criticize the inactivity of the Muslim population as a whole, and not just its leaders’, arising from a belief that ‘the Muslim community had not done enough to prevent support for terrorism in its midst’. Indeed, he reports the alarming finding that this belief has given rise to a widespread view that it is legitimate to target Muslims proactively for reasons of national security.

Three-fifths argued that Britain’s security services should now focus their intelligence-gathering and terrorism-prevention efforts on Muslims living in Britain or seeking to enter it, on the grounds that, although most Muslims were not terrorists, most terrorists threatening the country were Muslims ...

These perceptions are perhaps embodied in terminologies that collapse different issues together, a good example of which may be found in attitudes towards the term ‘Islamist terrorism’. Our centre-right national broadsheet journalist, for example, remains convinced that terrorism is an outgrowth of Islamism:

I think we still edge around certain issues ... For instance the government is reluctant to talk about Islamist terrorism even though somebody like Ed Hussein whose book *The Islamist* makes the point that there is a fundamental difference between Islam and Islamism. Unless you understand the ideological basis of it you don’t understand anything.

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56 Ibid.
It is worth noting how, despite the contested and relational nature of terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamism’, which invite qualification and contextualization, it is increasingly common to find statements of a seamless association between the two. This is a good example of what Richard Jackson has called a culturally embedded ‘hard’ discourse, since so many other assumptions compound and reinforce it. One example is Melanie Phillips’s statement that, ‘after the Rushdie affair, Islam in Britain became fused with an agenda of murder’. This characterization conceives the violence that is committed by Muslims as ‘something inherent in the religion, rendering any Muslim a potential terrorist’. While some scholars have gone to great lengths to argue that most Muslims consider violence and terrorism to be an egregious violation of their religion, at the level of public discourse, attempts to decouple the two are sometimes dismissed as oversensitive. And it is worth remembering that, in Field’s analysis, 56 per cent of survey respondents believed that a strongly held Muslim identity could lead to violence. It is therefore surprising to learn the following from our broadcast journalist about their organization’s internal debates over terminology:

In the end we’ve used a number of terms and you have to appreciate this is always tricky because in journalism you have to find more than one way of saying everything, otherwise it becomes boring. So we talk a lot about al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorism; the word ‘Islamist’ has become reasonably accepted as a way of describing a certain type of person who takes a view . . . but all these terms are tricky because there are people who might well describe themselves as an ‘Islamist’ but who would never dream of wanting to blow people up. . . . I’ve certainly been in meetings with . . . Muslims who have challenged the [broadcaster] . . . I suppose that’s what I mean by ‘we’ve come a long way’, we have been forced quite rightly to think about all these issues and I think we still wrestle with it, but I think we are better.

This is an instructive account because it suggests not only that broadcasters with a public remit in particular can be lobbied to take greater account of compelling sensitivities, but also that they have undergone an internal learning process that leads them to continue to ‘wrestle’ with the issues. The respondent balances their statement, however, with another in which they reiterate that the ‘real dangers for us and for all journalists in shying away from some of the real challenges that al-Qā‘ida-inspired philosophy presents for British society as a whole and indeed for all Muslims within British society’. On this issue, even our respondent from a centre-left national broadsheet shares a similar concern elaborated in the following extract:

I went to see Musharaf [the former president of Pakistan, on a visit to London] earlier this week and he got quite belligerent about this, and he was saying ‘don’t you point the finger at Pakistan, most of your home-grown people [terrorist suspects] are home-grown, that means they were born, they were bred, they were educated here ….’ Of course, he’s got a point; he’s got a very good point!

It is arguable that these attitudes give rise to the perception of the Muslim minority as a threat rather than in terms of measures designed to eliminate discrimination. This may of course stem from the ways in which some find it difficult to sympathize with a minority that is perceived to be disloyal or associated with terrorism.

Summary

This article has explored why there may be little sympathy for the notion that Muslim minorities are subject to racism by virtue of their real or perceived ‘Muslimness’ (in the way it is rightly accepted that Jewish minorities are sometimes the object of racism by virtue of their real or perceived ‘Jewishness’). It finds that the reasons are four-fold. First, there is a conceptualization of racism that assumes that the protections afforded to racial minorities conventionally conceived as involuntarily constituted should not be extended to Muslims because theirs is a religious identity that is voluntarily chosen. One salient, discursive, trope germane to this view chides Muslim minorities for the adoption of a ‘victim mentality’. Second, the way in which religion per se is frowned upon by the contemporary intelligentsia invites the conclusion that the ridiculing of Muslims is a sign of the health of intellectual debate and not, therefore, a matter of discrimination. Third, while ethnic identities are welcomed in the public space, there is much more unease about religious minorities. This means that some commentators, who may otherwise sympathize with Muslim communities, argue that it is difficult to view Muslims as victims when they may themselves be potential oppressors. Finally, some find it difficult to sympathize with a minority that is perceived to be disloyal or
associated with terrorism, a view that leads to a perception of Muslims as a threat rather than as a disadvantaged minority subject to increasingly pernicious discourses of racialization. Each of these findings invites further study and underscores the need for a more profound analysis of anti-Muslim discourse.

Nasar Meer is a lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Southampton. His forthcoming publications include *Identity, Citizenship and the New Politics of Multiculturalism* (Palgrave Macmillan).

Tariq Modood is the founding director of the Bristol University Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, and a founding co-editor of the journal *Ethnicities*. His recent publications include *Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship*, co-edited with Geoffrey Brahm Levey, foreword by Charles Taylor (Cambridge University Press 2009) and *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea* (Polity 2007).