Chapter 5

Multiculturalism and education in Britain: an internally contested debate

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Abstract

A British discourse on race, cultural diversity, and education began to evolve in the 1960s in response to the growing population of immigrants from the West Indies, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. By the 1980s that discourse had become fractured, with contending educational theories of multicultural and antiracist education. In retrospect, each of these positions can be seen to embody partial truths, but neither is adequate to the complex contemporary situation of Britain’s racial minorities. The emergence of a Muslim assertiveness, polarized qualification levels, new feminist interventions, and the wide appeal of black youth culture all challenge earlier notions of multiculturalism and anti-racism. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

As with many Western states, widespread public discussion of multiculturalism and the position and prospects of ethnic minorities has only occurred in Britain in the post-Second World War era. It was largely precipitated by the postcolonial labor migration from the West Indies in the late 1940s, followed soon after by men from rural South Asia. Legislation was passed to stem primary immigration in the early 1960s but the entry of dependants (and some categories of workers) was allowed. African–Caribbeans were the first to bring in spouses and children and were gradually followed by Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, the majority of whom achieved family reunification in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s respectively. An exception to this pattern were the East African refugees of Indian origin who were expelled or fled from the region (notably, Uganda) in the late 1960s to mid-1970s and by and large came into Britain as families, including children of school age.

Black and Asian children thus came into British schools in significant numbers much later than the period of adult migration and at different periods of time, with

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Caribbeans being some years ahead of Asian migrants. By the mid-1970s, South Asians had a numerical superiority over African–Caribbeans but this was unlikely to have been reflected in schools till some years later. Educational issues to do with black and Asian migration did not therefore arise in Britain until about the mid-1960s and, even then, only slowly in the case of South Asians. The initial educational issues, as with issues in relation to these migrant populations in general, could not be easily disentangled from the racialized rejection and perceived “alienness” of the newcomers.

In this early period of settlement the philosophies utilized to counter racial stereotypes and to attempt to attend the educational issues without racial bias consisted of the following:

- anticolor-prejudice or color-blind humanism of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. kind, which emphasized the importance of judging a person in terms of his or her own merits and not by their phenotype (Modood, 1999), and
- the welcoming of people of other cultures by encouraging their cultural practices, usually in superficial ways (later lampooned as a multiculturalism of the three “S’s:” saris, samosas, and steelbands) (see, for example, Troyna, 1987, 1993).

While generally well-meaning, in hindsight these initial, tentative responses to the early presence of ethnic minorities in British schools had little sense of the cultural isolation faced by them and the power of racism, both in schools and elsewhere. It was only as significant numbers of black and Asian children came to be in the school system that issues about their distinctive needs and their unfavorable treatment began to be identified.

1. Acknowledging racism

In the 1970s, in a climate in which “race” was becoming increasingly salient and ideas of black pride and black power (not only those imported from the US) were finding resonance among post-colonials in Britain, education came to be identified as one of the principal sites of racial(ized) oppression. There was the denial of black identity and history, but more important to many African–Caribbean parents was a growing recognition that their children were failing to acquire even the basic qualifications necessary for employment, let alone the social mobility aspired by their parents (see, for example, Stone, 1981). This was further evidenced by the fact that African–Caribbean youth, particularly boys, were increasingly in conflict with teachers, unemployed, and/or in trouble with the law (see, for example, Coard, 1971). Such was the concern generated by these patterns of educational failure, and related indices of social disadvantage and exclusion, that it led African–Caribbean

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1 Current estimates suggest that the non-white population in Britain at 3.6 millions is 6.5% of the total, of which about 3.1% is South Asian and 1.4% is African–Caribbean (CMEB, 2000); about half of the South Asian origin is Muslim, a religious community estimated to be about 1.5 million, making it as populous as all other non-Christian faiths combined.
parents in the 1970s to establish supplementary (Saturday) schools for their children (see Chevannes & Reeves, 1987; Reay & Mirza, 1997) and the then Labour government in 1977 to ask for “a high level and independent inquiry into the causes of the underachievement of children of West Indian origin.” The inquiry, established in 1979, had its terms of reference extended to “review...the educational needs and attainments of children from (all) ethnic minority groups” (DES, 1981), taking account of factors outside of the education system. It produced an interim report, the Rampton Report, under the name of its chairperson, in 1981.

The Rampton Report drew on research from six local education authorities to highlight the differential performance of “West Indian” children in relation to three other categories (“Asians,” “Whites,” “All Other Leavers”). It was significant for highlighting racism as a factor in the poor educational performance of African–Caribbean students, although in its conclusions on educational performance it failed to account for the impact of social class, or acknowledge sufficiently variations in educational performance between and within ethnic minority groups. Issues of particular concern to the inquiry in this respect included evidence of cultural biases in IQ testing, the negative racial stereotyping of ethnic minority students—particularly, African–Caribbean boys—by teachers, and the general inadequacy of teacher training in preparing teachers for multicultural classrooms (DES, 1981). The inquiry’s emphasis on teacher racism caused considerable controversy and under pressure from the new Conservative government, Anthony Rampton was forced to resign, to be replaced by Michael Swann.

The final inquiry report, known as the Swann Report, presented more sophisticated and differentiated research findings showing that though African–Caribbeans were achieving much lower results than whites, Asians and whites were achieving similar results. While continuing to recognize the impact of both individual racism and a “more pervasive climate of racism” (DES, 1985, p. 36), the Swann Report also shifted its emphasis away from overt antiracist strategies toward a form of “inclusive multiculturalism,” as signaled by its formal title, Education for All. It saw multicultural education as enabling “all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate fully in shaping society... whilst also allowing, and where necessary assisting the ethnic minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within a framework of commonly accepted values” (DES, 1985, p. 5). But this form of multiculturalism also had its limits. What constituted a common framework of values was simply assumed, not debated. Linguistic diversity was acknowledged as a “positive asset” but the idea of bilingual education (except as a transition to English) was rejected—minority languages, it was argued, should be restricted to the home and to the ethnic minority community (for a critique of this position, see Tollefson, 1991; May, 2001). In similar vein, the Report rejected the notion of separate “ethnic minority” schools, particularly “Islamic” schools. Despite acknowledging the longstanding presence of Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish schools, it viewed the prospect of Muslim schools as socially divisive. Moreover, it firmly distanced itself from religious instruction in schools, arguing “the role of education cannot be, and cannot be expected to be, to reinforce the values, beliefs, and cultural identity which each child brings to school” (DES, 1985, p. 321).
Given that this was the heyday of “Thatcherism,” the idea of multicultural education was largely ignored by central government and only patchily experimented with by some local authorities and schools. It is ironic then that the Swann Report was also responsible for contributing significantly to a high profile academic debate concerning the relative merits of multicultural and antiracist education. Indeed, a peculiar feature of the British context is the degree of animosity exhibited between proponents of multicultural and antiracist education throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and into the 1990s. This animosity, in turn, led to a bipolar construction of multicultural and antiracist education that has only recently begun to break down (Gillborn, 1995; May, 1999a, b).

2. Multicultural versus antiracist education

Much of the impetus for the bipolar construction of multicultural and antiracist education in Britain originated, and was sustained, by antiracist educators; in effect, multicultural and antiracist education were regarded, at least by antiracist educators, as “oppositional and antagonistic forms” (Mullard, 1984, p. 12). Drawing on a neo-Marxist critique of multiculturalism, antiracist educators thus constructed multicultural education, and multiculturalism more broadly, as an irredeemably “deracialized” discourse of schooling; an educational approach which reified culture and cultural difference, and which failed to address the central issue of racism within society. The consequent emphases in multicultural education initiatives on changing individual attitudes, fostering cultural understanding and awareness, and raising the self-esteem of minority students—all features exemplified in the Swann Report—were regarded at best as mere incrementalism, and at worst as an attempt “to divert and minimize black struggle” by neglecting the wider “political dimension and power structures” (Grinter, 1990, p. 212; see also Mullard, 1982, 1984; Brandt, 1986; Gillborn, 1990).

This was a view most associated with the late Barry Troyna (Troyna, 1982, 1987, 1993; Troyna & Hatcher, 1992; Troyna & Williams, 1986). For Troyna, antiracism was necessarily a form of “benign racialization” because “race” and racism had to be acknowledged before it could be opposed. Critically, it was not aimed at minority students; a preoccupation of multicultural education much criticized by antiracists. Rather, it was a political education that highlighted the processes and effects of racism within society, along with other forms of discrimination, and the implications of these for all students.

But if antiracism was critical of multiculturalism, it also faced considerable problems of its own. The most prominent, and most debilitating of these, at least in the British context, have been:

- Its rejection of culturalism in any form, resulting in a subsequent inability to account for and contest the growing phenomenon of “cultural racisms;”
- An allied tendency to promote a wider political program that essentialized the “black subject” and reinforced a bipolar black/white dichotomy; and
An important specific consequence of the above two tendencies was the minimizing of the distinctive experiences and concerns of Asians.

These weaknesses were brought into sharp public criticism by a third important report on race and education in Britain, the Burnage Report (MacDonald, Bhavnani, Khan, & John, 1989). It investigated a racially motivated murder of an Asian student, Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, at Burnage High School in Manchester in 1986, a school that had a strong antiracist policy. Though broadly sympathetic to the tenets of antiracism, the report concluded that the school’s particular antiracist policy contributed to the incident. The school’s policy was described as doctrinaire and divisive, an approach the report termed more broadly “moral” or “symbolic” antiracism, in which “white students are all seen as ‘racist’, whether they are ferrety-eyed fascists or committed antiracists… [and where] there is no room for issues of class, sex, age or size” (p. 402).

The failure of the 1980s antiracist theory and policy to integrate South Asian experience and concerns was not raised by the Burnage Report, but was politically evident by the end of the decade. South Asians thus began increasingly to reject publicly the antiracist term “black” as inappropriate for themselves, arguing that its symbolic power came from its capacity to project and give pride to persons of African ancestry, inevitably marginalizing South Asians and their concerns (Modood, 1988, 1994). For many South Asians, such concerns included centrally the impact of what might be described as “cultural-racism,” racism which uses cultural difference to vilify or marginalize or demand cultural assimilation from groups that also suffer color-racism. This is a racism which is directed not just to someone of color (who may share a common culture with whites), but to groups who are perceived to be culturally different and who seek to maintain at least some of those differences (Modood, 1997a; CMEB, 2000). South Asians were just such groups, and concerns among them about passing on their distinctive religions, languages, customs, family structures and so on to the younger generation were, in fact, much more amenable to conceptualization in “multiculturalist” than “antiracist” terms. This was not least because the former, for all its perceived inadequacies, continued to recognize the significance of cultural practices at its heart (Hoffman, 1996; May, 1999a). It became clear through disputes such as the Honeyford Affair in Bradford, when a headteacher, Ray Honeyford, incurred the wrath of local Pakistanis for insulting Pakistani culture (see Halstead 1994), and the campaign for state-funded Muslim schools (Walford, 1994), that some of the most frequent and intractable issues that were arising in relation to ethnic minorities and schools could not be fruitfully addressed in terms of “color racism.”

Moreover, the growing collection of data in relation to the attainment of educational qualifications, entry into higher education, entry into the professions, job-levels and earnings began to belie the view that non-whiteness equated directly with an underclass positioning (Modood, 1992; Jones, 1993). Thus, the data on differential educational achievement among ethnic minorities, first highlighted by the Swann Inquiry (see above), continued to be confirmed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, though unfortunately the data was still collected for some time using an
undifferentiated ‘Asian’ category. When later “Asian” was unpacked into “Indian,” “Pakistani,” “Bangladeshi,” and so on, it was found that the Asian-white parity hid the fact that Indians, especially East African Asians, were achieving better than whites, but the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were doing even worse than Caribbeans (Modood et al., 1997). This simultaneously challenged the view that all non-white groups perform worse than whites, and that blacks perform worst, further suggesting the lack of utility of dualistic black–white models and the suggestion that academic underachievement was primarily caused by color-racism.

These kinds of developments—which revealed a stratified heterogeneity that was far from confined to education—led to and chimed with theoretical reinterpretations of “the black subject” as being intrinsically plural and not reducible to a single authentic, essential type (Gilroy, 1987; Hall, 1992). Even so, much of this new theorizing, welcome as it was, did not go far enough and still prioritized African–Caribbean experience. For example, it still argued, contrary to the available evidence, that the developments in question were suggestive of a new, more nuanced and pluralized “the black subject,” rather than an Asian repudiation of political blackness (Modood, 1998a, p. 84). It also excluded religious identity and “Islamophobia,” despite the real-world vilification of Muslim identity.

The development that really cut across the multiculturalism versus antiracism debate was the emergence and rapid rise of a Muslim identity, and with it the demand for the institutionalization of Islam in schools. As previously noted, the Swann Report envisaged a secular multiculturalism and expressly ruled out Islamic schools or Islamic instruction from a state-sponsored multiculturalism. But many multiculturalists have given ground on this and the British government has in fact accepted two Muslim primary schools into the state sector, while recently approving the first Muslim secondary (girls) school. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that while multiculturalists see Muslims as a community that ought to be supported, many are unhappy by what they see as the Muslims’ reinforcement of conservative, sometimes even “fundamentalist” positions in relation to religion and gender. Consequently, many multiculturalists are undecided about how socially and politically important religious identity should be allowed to become and are calling for public debate on these issues (CMEB, 2000). The position of antiracists is even more uncomfortable. Not only is their secularism usually more strident (Saghal & Yuval-Davis, 1992), but some Muslims have become vigorous critics of race-based politics, criticizing its apparent lack of concern with the widespread discrimination faced by Muslims. In addition, criticism has been levelled at antiracism for its failure to recognize adequately that by most inequality measures it is Asian Muslims, and not African–Caribbeans, as policymakers expected, who have emerged as the most disadvantaged and poorest groups in Britain (Modood et al., 1997). To many Muslim activists the misplacing of Muslims into “race” categories and the belatedness with which the severe disadvantages of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis

\[\text{To this date it is lawful to discriminate against Muslims qua Muslims because the courts do not accept that Muslims are an ethnic group (though oddly, Jews and Sikhs are recognized as ethnic groups within the meaning of the law).}\]
has come to be recognized by policy-makers means, at best, that race relations are an inappropriate policy niche for Muslims (UKACIA, 1993). At worst, they see it as a conspiracy to prevent the emergence of a specifically Muslim sociopolitical formation (Muslim Parliament, 1992). Yet, for better or for worse, it has to be recognized that the presence of the Muslim community is now as important a factor in British education as any other minority or “race” issues, though in most cases racism, ethnicity and religious identity are intertwined.

3. Some current issues

3.1. Polarized achievement levels

Data over more than a decade now show that nearly or nearly all ethnic minority groups manifest a strong drive for qualifications. Both sexes in all minority groups are at least as likely to participate in post-compulsory education. (This is now even true for Caribbean males and Bangladeshi females, two groups about whom at various time anxiety has been raised about educational participation and performance.) Some groups, such as the African Asians and the Chinese, are much more likely to participate (Modood et al., 1997). Participation rates do not in themselves mean high levels of qualifications. But as a matter of fact, some ethnic minorities outperform whites, and others do well enough to achieve as good and usually a better share of places in higher education, though so far this is disproportionately in less prestigious institutions. Proportionately, at least twice as many 18–24 year old Africans, Chinese, Asian-Others and Indians now enter university than do whites, including in the two most competitive subjects, medicine and law (Modood & Shiner, 1994). These are remarkable achievements that were unanticipated by most of the experts and even today are not easy to assimilate within antiracist/multiculturalist analyses (Modood & Acland, 1998). This is not to suggest that racism was a mirage or has disappeared. These achievements have been in spite of racism, difficulties of cultural adaptation and socioeconomic disadvantage. These achievements have been in spite of racism, difficulties and socioeconomic disadvantage. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that there may be some racial discrimination even in the university admissions process.3

The point is that this is a phenomenon that does not fit the prevalent analytical approaches because they assumed a “deficit model” in relation to ethnic minorities. They failed to note that migrants and ethnic minorities had educational ambitions that were not in keeping with their initial class position in Britain and that the British educational system would be sufficiently open and supportive to enable minority groups to at least partially realize their ambitions. The point about partial realization

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3 Significant ethnic differences in the rates of admissions remain unexplained after taking academic and social class related factors into account. The most worrying of these is that Caribbean and Pakistani applicants were less likely than other candidates to gain admission into the most competitive universities (Modood & Shiner, 1994)
is critical. For together with the achievements that have just been highlighted, it has
to be asserted that groups such as Caribbeans, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis still
have much larger proportions of school leavers with no or hardly any qualifications
(Modood et al., 1997). African–Caribbeans, and perhaps the other groups too, also
experience disproportionate disciplining and exclusions from schools (CMEB 2000,
p. 152)—exactly the concerns with which our story began. Some of these differential
experiences and outcomes can be directly attributed to social class, especially, the
pre-migration class of migrants and their descendents. Thus, it is not surprising that
East African Asians, who came from professional and commercial backgrounds and
on arrival were better educated than the white population they were joining, should
have done and continue to do so much better than, for example, those from rural
Pakistan, who in many cases did not even speak English (Modood et al., 1997,
Chapter 3). On the other hand, a class analysis must not overlook the special
motivation of migrants and distinctive forms of ethnicity, evident, for example, in
the fact that though British Pakistanis suffer much higher levels of deprivation than
their white peers, they proportionally produce higher levels of university applicants
and entrants (Modood, 1998b). There is, then, a polarized pattern in ethnic minority
achievement levels and it would be fair to say that commentators tend to build their
analyses around one or the other pole. So far no account has emerged which is able
to do explanatory justice to both. To do so, however, is clearly one of the current
challenges.

3.2. Religion, gender and secularism

In the UK as elsewhere, the issue of gender equality is prominent in the debate
about the place of religion in a multicultural society. Some feminists argue that
Muslims in particular and organized religion in general are patriarchal and want to
control and educate women to serve the interests of men (Yuval-Davis, 1992; Saghal
& Yuval-Davis, 1992). Some feminists cite the rules on “modest dress” and the
wearing of the hijab (Islamic headscarf) as examples of how women are confined by
Islam. There is, however, a growing literature—some of it by writers who call
themselves “Islamic feminists” (Kabbani, 1989)—that suggests that wearers of the
hijab are not under pressure by their parents or male elders to wear the hijab.
(Sometimes, indeed, parents are dismayed by the “born-again fanaticism” of their
daughters.) Rather, they actually feel liberated from the unwanted sexual interest of
men by devices such as the hijab.

Some feminists reacted to the angry Muslim protest against Salman Rushdie’s
novel, The Satanic Verses, by creating the radical secularist organization, Women
Against Fundamentalism. The principal argument of groups such as this is that
religion belongs to the private sphere and is not a legitimate basis for a public
identity. Indeed, in some respects their position resembles the position on Islam
taken by the Swann Report. This public–private distinction is a classical liberal one,
although it has never been followed in a pure form except, in different ways, perhaps
in France and the USA. It is of course incompatible with the feminist and other
politics-of-difference perspectives that have always insisted on the essentially
contested nature of the public-private distinction (Benhabib, 1992; Fraser, 1992), arguing that “the personal is the political.” Most radically, it is said that the inclusion of religious minorities, like Muslims, into the British polity requires not just the abolition of the Church of England’s constitutional privileges but the severance of any relationship between the state, local or central, and religion. One explicit implication of this would be the phasing out of state funding for denominational schools, of which there are thousands. Initially, there were few members of religious minorities joining this discussion and so the secular multiculturalists were taken to be speaking for the marginal religious minorities. More recently, spokespersons of a number of non-Christian religious minorities have argued for the importance of maintaining a symbolic and substantive link between religion and the state (Modood, 1997b). It is clear, therefore, that debates around secularism and gender are now on the agenda of multiculturalism and will loom large in the future.

3.3. Hybridity and new Britishness

An understanding of contemporary multicultural developments would be incomplete without recognizing a powerful current away from discrete collectivities in favor of social and cultural mixing, and a new confidence amongst the second and third generation descendants of British migrants. For example, the large Fourth Survey of Ethnic Minorities found that while the ethnic minority young strongly identified with a minority identity, this did not compete with a sense of Britishness (Modood et al., 1997). Around three-quarters of young Asians said that they felt British and Indian/Pakistani, etc., suggesting the emergence of hyphenated or multiple identities. Intermarriage rates in Britain are also quite remarkable. For example, among the British-born, of those who had a partner, half of Caribbean men, a third of Caribbean women, a fifth of Indian and African Asian men, a tenth of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men, and a very few South Asian women had a white partner. In the Fourth Survey, 40 per cent of Caribbean children who were living with two parents had one white parent.

The African–Caribbean-white social, cultural, sexual, and generational mix is now so deep in Britain that it is bound soon to have a profound impact on the idea of a black community, though these matters are not yet being discussed in public. What is openly discussed by leading black analysts is the vibrant strength of a black British cultural identity. Darcus Howe has spoken of black people having “a social ease and confidence now that we have not had before” (Younge, 1995). Henry Louis Gates Jr. believes that “a culture that is distinctively black and British can be said to be in full flower” (Gates, 1997, p. 196). Stuart Hall has argued not only that “black British culture could be described as confident beyond measure in its own identity”(Hall, 1998, p. 39), but also that young black people have made themselves “the defining force in street-oriented British youth culture” (Hall, 1998, p. 40). A group that comprises less than 2 per cent of the population has, both in terms of quantity and quality, established itself as a leading-edge presence in urban youth culture in the face of racism, social deprivation, and relative exclusion from positions of power and
wealth. From being pariahs, many black people have become objects of desire, with many young whites envying and imitating their “style” (see, for example, Hall cited in Gates, 1997, p. 196).

On the other hand, black people continue to experience high levels of racial discrimination in many other social areas and are grossly over-represented as criminal offenders and in prison. Black cultural success, which to some extent is now being joined by a related British Asian youth culture, and the new hybric mixes and hyphenated identities can neither be understood in terms of classic assimilation nor classic pluralism. Such new forms are complicating the ‘British–Other’ distinction and will require in the future a more complex analysis of ethnicity and cultural diversity.

4. Conclusion

Even though some of the criticisms of multicultural education by British antiracists were certainly well merited at the time they were made, we have tried to show how from its initial focus on “color-racism,” racial-equalitarian concerns in Britain have had to broaden to engage with a variety of complex and contradictory issues that cannot easily be held within a rubric of antiracism. The lesson, rather slow to be drawn in Britain, is that the antagonism between multiculturalism and antiracism was always a false dichotomy. Such positions can be seen to be dialectically engaged voices that address the weakness of the other, rather than as oppositional forces. This has been more readily understood elsewhere, notably in North America, where interesting and creative syntheses of these positions have emerged (see, for example, Sleeter & McLaren, 1995; McLaren, 1995, 1997; May, 1999b). Meanwhile, the principal charge of antiracists that multicultural education held too optimistic view of the impact of the multicultural curriculum on the social and economic futures of minority students has now become widely acknowledged in Britain, as elsewhere, not least by multiculturalists themselves (see May, 1994a, b, 1999a; Short & Carrington, 1996, 1999).

Similarly, the antiracist criticism that early forms of multicultural education adopted a far too simplistic and naive view of wider social and cultural power relations has subsequently come to be addressed—most notably, via critical multiculturalism (see Goldberg, 1994; Kanpol & McLaren, 1995; May, 1999b). The development of critical multiculturalism has also led, at the level of theory at least, to a shift away from the earlier—and implicitly pathological—preoccupation with ethnic minority educational underachievement, which tended to be overgeneralized initially by both British antiracists and multiculturalists. Theory clearly cannot be premised on the assumption that minorities will underperform when some minorities are exceptionally motivated and are outperforming the white working class. Instead, broader structural questions of racism and disadvantage have increasingly come to be directly addressed, as well as questions concerning how to include majority as well as minority students in educating for a multicultural society (see, for example, Kalantzis & Cope, 1999; Nieto, 2000; Sleeter, 1996).
That said, more recent accounts of multiculturalism and antiracism in the British context are only now beginning to address the natural corollary of the disaggregation of “blackness” that has occurred here in recent years, namely a more critical, heterogenous view of “whiteness” (Bonnett, 1996). Again, the response to this challenge in Britain has been relatively slow, although the launch of a report in October 2000 by the independent Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB, 2000) does address directly the questions surrounding a monolithic conception of whiteness and its past implicit (at times, explicit) association with the concept of “Britishness.” Indeed, the CMEB report, *The future of multi-ethnic Britain*, may represent a moment when the best in antiracism is brought together with the latest in multiculturalism. Certainly, the dialectic between the two is not over yet.

**References**


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