Is There a Crisis of Secularism in Western Europe?

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By secularism or more specifically political secularism, I mean institutional arrangements such that religious authority and religious reasons for action and political authority and political reasons for action are distinguished; so, political authority does not rest on religious authority and the latter does not dominate political authority. Support for such arrangements can be derived from a religion or a religious authority, and certainly are supported by many religious people.¹ On this very broad conception of political secularism, there is no necessary, absolute separation of religion and political rule, let alone that the state should be hostile to religion, though of course such radical views are also amongst those recognizable as political secularism. Many different institutional arrangements and many different political views and ideologies, democratic and antidemocratic, liberal and illiberal, and proreligion and antireligion are consistent with this minimal conception of secularism: the nondomination of political authority by religious authority.

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¹“Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” is of course a political view based on the authority of St. Matthew’s Gospel.
I take subscription to this idea to be central to modernity and therefore one of the dominant ideas of the twentieth century. I do not mean that everybody in modern societies agrees with this view, and of course like all ideas it is not perfectly or purely manifested in any actual case, and people will disagree about the specific cases. Nevertheless, like democracy, political secularism is a hegemonic idea that most people actively and passively support and few argue against in a full-throated way.

An increasing number of academics think that in recent years, something highly significant, possibly epochal, has happened to this state of affairs. Established modern societies are producing critics of this taken for granted idea in their midst and emergent modern societies do not seem to be smoothly following in the path that led to the historical ascendancy of political secularism. My interest is specifically in Western Europe. Jurgen Habermas, who has Western Europe very much at the forefront of his mind, has famously announced that we are currently witnessing a transition from a secular to a “postsecular society” in which “secular citizens” have to express a previously denied respect for “religious citizens,” who should be allowed, even encouraged, to critique aspects of contemporary society and to find solutions to its problems from within their religious views (Habermas 2006). Instead of treating religion as subrational and a matter of private concern only, religion is once again to be recognized as a legitimate basis of public engagement and political action. Some have gone further and speak of a global crisis. Even quite sober academics speak today of “a contemporary crisis of secularism” (Scherer 2010:4) and that “today, political secularisms are in crisis in almost every corner of the globe” (Jakelić 2010:3). Olivier Roy, in an analysis focused on France, writes of “the crisis of the secular state” (Roy 2007) and Rajeev Bhargava of the “crisis of the secular state in Europe” (Bhargava 2010, 2011).2

Of course, there is larger and more specifically sociological thesis about “desecularization” across the world, about the development of modern economies and institutions without a decline and indeed by some reversal of an earlier decline in religious belief and practice (Berger 1999). My interest is limited to the phenomenon of public religion and so of how religion is fighting back from its political marginalization. Across the globe, religious groups are protesting against perceived demotion or marginalization in the public space. There is a sense of actual or potential marginality, both culturally and politically, of losing the public space that should rightfully, at least partly, belong to one (Jurgensmeyer 1994; Marty and Appleby 1994). This can lead to protest and even anger and an assertive politics. Yet, while in most parts of the world, the protestors seek to restore a real, or more probably imagined past, a golden age before the marginalization, this is not the case in Western

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2Bhargava does not believe the crisis is confined to Europe, see also Zucca (2009).
Europe. More fundamentally, while in the other regions, there is a sense that a religious majority has been or is being marginalized, in Western Europe, the group most expressing its sense of marginalization is a minority. So, while the religionist agitation in the United States, the Muslim world and India is about the status and re-empowerment of the religious majority, of making the country in the image of the religious majority, the issue in Europe is about the status of a minority and its right to change the countries that it has recently become part of or is trying to be accepted as part of. Insofar as the dominant religion, Christianity, exhibits a new political assertiveness, it is primarily in reaction to the minority presence and politics and in a context of continuing decline in Christian religiosity and church membership. The majoritarian reaction is sometimes in terms of a sympathetic multiculturalist or multifaith accommodation, but all too often and growingly, in secularist and Christianist oppositional modes. The majority are reacting to the minority, not to the felt constraints of “secularism” and so the form of the challenge is not a religious resurgence but an ethno-religious multiculturalism—indeed, not postsecularism but secularism, or neo-secularism is one of the leading majoritarian responses, especially in France.

THE ACCOMMODATION OF MUSLIMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

There is no endogenous slowing down in secularization in relation to organized religion, attendance at church services, and traditional Christian belief and practice in Western Europe. For example, to illustrate with the British case, church attendance of at least once a month amongst white people has steadily declined from about 20 percent in 1983 to about 15 percent in 2008 and with each younger age cohort (BRIN 2011; Kaufmann et al. Forthcoming; Voas and Crockett 2005). Which is not to say that religion has disappeared or is about to, but for many, it has become more in the form of “belief without belonging” (Davie 1994) or spirituality (Heelas and Woodhead 2005) or “implicit religion” (Bailey 1997). For example, while belief in a personal God has gone down from over 40 percent in the middle of the twentieth century to less than 30 percent by its end, belief in a spirit or life source has remained steady at around 35–40 percent and belief in the soul has actually increased from less than 60 percent in the early 1980s to an additional 5–10 percent today (BRIN 2011). All these changes however are highly compatible with political secularism if not with scientism or other rationalistic philosophies. Whether the decline of traditional religion is being

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⁢Peter Berger expressly mentions “Europe, west of what used to be called the Iron Curtain” as an exception to his desecularization thesis (1999:9). This is a good geographic approximation of what I mean by Western Europe.
replaced by no religion or new ways of being religious or spiritual, neither is creating a challenge for political secularism. Nontraditional forms of Christian or post-Christian religion in Western Europe are in the main not attempting to connect with or reform political institutions and government policies; they are not seeking recognition or political accommodation or political power.\(^4\)

In recent decades, Western Europe has come to share the postimmigration racial and ethnic urban diversity, which has long been a characteristic of the United States.\(^5\) Currently, most of the largest, especially the capital, cities of north-west Europe are about 20–35 percent nonwhite (i.e., people of non-European descent, including Turks). Even without further large-scale immigration, being a young, fertile population, these proportions will grow for at least one or two generations more before they stabilize, reaching, or exceeding 50 percent in some cities in the next few decades or sooner. The trend will include some of the larger urban centers of southern Europe. A significant difference between Western Europe and the United States, however, is that the majority of nonwhites in the countries of Europe are Muslims.\(^6\) With estimates of 12 to over 17 millions Muslims in Western Europe today, the Muslim population in the former EU-15 is only about 3–5 percent and is relatively evenly distributed across the larger states (Peach 2007; Pew Forum 2010). In the larger cities, the proportion which is Muslim, however, is several times larger and growing at a faster rate than most of the population (Lutz et al. 2007). In this context, with the riots in the banlieues of Paris and elsewhere, the Danish cartoon affair and other issues about offense and freedom of speech, and the proliferating bans on various forms of female Muslim dress just being a few in a series of conflicts focused on minority–majority relations, questions about integration, equality, racism, and Islam, and their relation to terrorism, security, and foreign policy have become central to European politics.

The issue, then, driving the sense of a crisis of secularism that some sense in Western Europe is the place of Muslim identities, or identities that are or are perceived to be ethno-religious (like British Asian Muslim or Arab Muslim in France) in the public life of the countries of the region. This multicultural challenge to secularism is amongst the most profound political and long-term issues to arise from the postwar Western European hunger for labor migrants and the reversal of the population flows of European colonialism. The

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\(^4\)It may be the case that some government policies are seeking to delegate certain welfare responsibilities but that is not based on rethinking secularism or Christianity but on wishing to limit the scale of the state for revenue or other reasons.

\(^5\)Of course, the presence of black people in the United States as a whole is a consequence not of immigration but slavery, but the urban racial and ethnic mix is due to internal migration as well as to many waves of immigration.

\(^6\)The UK, where Muslims form about one-third of nonwhites or ethnic minorities, is one of the exceptions.
challenge is far from confined to secularism. It is a broad one: from socioeconomic disadvantage and discrimination in the labor markets at one end to a constitutional status or corporate relationship with the state at the other. Moreover, the awareness of this challenge is not due to terrorism as it began to manifest itself and was perceived before events such as 9/11; nor, is it due to the fact that some Muslims, unlike other postimmigration groups, may have been involved in rowdy demonstrations and riots, because others (such as African-Caribbeans in Britain) are associated with these without raising such profound normative questions.

Nor is it due to (Muslim) conservative values, especially in relation to gender and sexuality, though it is related to it. The core element of the challenge is the primacy given to religion as the basis of identity, organization, political representation, normative justification, etc. These matters were thought to be more or less settled (except in a few exceptional cases like Northern Ireland) till some Muslims started to assert themselves as Muslims in the public sphere of various West European countries. Some have thought that primacy could be given to say gender, ethnicity, or class; others that primacy should not be given to any one or even a few of these social categories as identity self-concepts, but very few thought that religion should be in the select set (Modood 2005; Modood et al. 2006).

MULTICULTURALISM

It is not the mere presence of Muslims or Islam that creates a challenge all by itself. It is the presence of Muslims mediated by or in interaction with contemporary values of European states and politics. In particular, we should attend to two key complexes of political ideas, norms, and practices which predate and are independent of Muslim immigrant politics but which make available a certain political opportunity structure for Muslims to make claims that create majoritarian and secularist anxieties. Muslims have been able to adapt and utilize these evolving political complexes and this gives a distinctive character to the phenomenon of interest.

The first one of these is not to do with secularism or desecularization or public assertive religions per se, but with certain kinds of claims for accommodation from within western polities and normative viewpoints in relation to minorities generally. Let us call these debates and activities, multiculturalism. These discourses and practices of nondiscrimination, rights, equal accommodation, and respect are largely discourses from within Western European normative debates, norms, and laws (though influenced by a larger climate of opinion led particularly by Anglophone, colonial settler, and immigration-based countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia). They are picked up postimmigration and when Muslims or other groups utilize them, the reference is to the status and resources available to other groups in the West, not
"homelands." The second complex I have in mind is the religion–state linkages and support structures that exist in Western European countries, which I will call, moderate secularism.

Multicultural citizenship refers to the presence of ideas, ethos, and politics of “difference,” which allows for the articulation and legitimacy (and illegitimacy) of dealing with certain kinds of claims, in ways that are deemed acceptable and satisfactory. Briefly, I mean three things here (for further details, see Modood 2007). First, there is the critique of those portrayals of political systems, including contemporary liberal democratic states like those of Western Europe, as consisting of universal norms and rights. The critique is that such norms and rights are inflected by particular historical traditions and national cultures which give distinctive interpretations to ideas such as individual and group, public and private, rights and obligations and so create a de facto second-class citizenship for those who do not identify with that culture or are not privileged within it. Secondly, despite legal definitions and idealized norms of equality between all individuals, many people see either themselves and/or other citizens not just as individuals or citizens but in terms of membership of groups such as women, black people, or Muslims. These identities are often imposed upon individuals as markers of social inferiority but equally (and simultaneously) can be forms of self-identity and pride and indeed resistance to inferiorization. Given this, then thirdly, the challenge of creating equality between historically privileged and disadvantaged groups within a citizenry is unlikely to be achieved by acting as if group identities no longer exist. In relation to color-racism, such pretense is called the pursuit of colorblind policies and by analogy, one can speak of gender blindness and Muslim blindness in relation to citizenship equality. It is contended that full civic equality will require not just policies treating all citizens as individuals but additionally, policies, institutions, and discourses which “recognize” (Taylor 1994) that certain group identities are victims of negative treatment, are not going to disappear, and should not be required to disappear. So the best approach is a politics of respect which turns these negative identities into positively valued ones and to remake our sense of common citizenship and nationality to include them. This is my understanding of political multiculturalism based on the ideas of political theorists such as Charles Taylor, Bhikhu Parekh, Iris Young, and Will Kymlicka, though I understand that it is not what many Western European politicians, journalists, and social commentators who are critical of multiculturalism may mean by multiculturalism (Modood 2007, 2011). My point is that it is the presence, adaptation, and disputation of these ideas and rhetorics which gives the question of the accommodation of Muslims the character it has, namely a

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7Though new discourses of Islam emerge that develop these concepts and see the ideals of some contemporary western publics (e.g., feminists, multiculturalists, anti-imperialists, etc.) as ideals within Islam too that have regrettably been obscured in the past (e.g., Safi 2003).
multiculturalist character. The result is that to talk about the integration of Muslims in Western Europe today is to argue about multiculturalism. Indeed, the converse has also become true. To talk about multiculturalism today in Western Europe is to talk about—pro and con—the accommodation of Muslims.

MODERATE SECULARISM

It is undeniably true that in terms of vocabulary, concepts, and institutional practices, each country in Western Europe is a secular state, but each has its own distinctive take on what this means. Nevertheless, there is a general historical character, which I call moderate secularism, and a lesser strand. The latter is principally manifested in French laicite, which seeks to create a public space in which religion is virtually banished in the name of reason and emancipation, and religious organizations are monitored by the state through consultative national mechanisms. The main Western European approach, however, sees organized religion as not just a private benefit but as a potential public good or national resource, and which the state can in some circumstances assist to realize—even through an “established” church (Modood 2010a). These public benefits can be direct such as a contribution to education and social care through autonomous church-based organizations funded by the taxpayer; or indirect, such as the production of attitudes that create economic hope or family stability; and they can be to do with national identity, cultural heritage, ethical voice, and national ceremonies.

Western Europe has been a site of a historical struggle between public churches and political secularists, yet during the nineteenth and especially the twentieth centuries and especially in Protestant-majority societies, this has not been deeply conflictual and has taken the form of various shifting compromises. The compromises consisted of a successful accommodation of an expanding number of Christian churches within the business and symbolic workings of the state, yet marked by a gradual but decisive weakening of the public and political character of the churches. The 1960s till the end of the century saw a particularly strong movement of opinion and politics in favor of the secularists. In Western Europe, the cultural revolution of the 1960s has been broadly accepted, not only has there been no major, sustained counter-movement but it broadened out from north-western Protestant/secular Europe into Catholic Europe. So, for example, the national system of “pillarization” in the Netherlands, by which Protestants and Catholics had separate access to some of the state’s resources emerged in the nineteenth century, declined sharply in the middle of the twentieth and was formally wound up in 1983. The Lutheran Church in Sweden was disestablished in 2000. In the UK, disestablishment of the Church of England was embraced in the early 1990s by the Liberal Democrats, the third political party in the country, by the influential
think tank, the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR—probably the largest British think tank in the 1990s and a key player in the remaking of the post-Thatcher Labour Party into a governing party), by the left-wing of the Labour Party and the two liberal-left national newspapers (for details, see Modood 1992:85, 1994). Catholic countries—Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland—in the 1980s and 1990s showed rapid signs of the secularization characteristic of Protestant Europe (cf., Davie 1999:69–70 with Davie 2002:6–7).

Of course, this has not meant that public religion, even the formal connections to the state and direct access to governments, disappeared altogether. There has been a trend toward less public recognition, but it has not led to anything like a terminal endpoint, not even in France. Nor, on the other hand, has there been much political challenge from organized religion or political conflict involving religion (Northern Ireland’s exceptional character proving the rule). The place of religion in Western Europe has been relatively uncontroversial in the last decades of the twentieth century because religion has not been particularly visible and there has been a general assumption—perhaps shared by many religious people, perhaps even by religious lobbies—that the decreasing public presence of religion is irreversible and better than a political fight to reverse the trend or to take decisive action to take it to its endpoint. Religion did not cease to be public, but because it was not felt to be too challenging or threatening, it was noticed less. For example, a political campaign on a religious matter or led by religious people was less likely to be reported by the media than, say, an antiracist or environmentalist protest.

RESPONDING TO MUSLIM ASSERTIVENESS

This, then, is the context in which non-Christian migrants have been arriving and settling and in which they and the next generation were becoming active members of their societies, including making political claims of equality and accommodation. So, the rising multicultural challenge and the gradual weakening of the political status of Christian churches, in particular the national churches, were taking place at the same time. The intersection of these two trajectories is nicely captured in two policy initiatives in the Netherlands in 1983. In that year in which the national system of “pillarization,” which had at one time made the country a bi-religious communal state, was formally wound up, a new Minorities Policy (Nota Minderhedenbeleid) was announced (see Bader 2011; Lentin and Tittley 2011:107–8) that created post-immigration ethnic minorities (allochtones) as a mini-pillar, giving them state funding for faith schools, ethno-religious radio and TV broadcasting, and other forms of cultural maintenance (Bader 2011).

Some of that policy began to be reversed in the 1990s, but looking beyond the Netherlands, the pivotal moment was 1988–1989 and was, quite accidentally, marked by two events. These created national and international storms,
and set in motion political developments which have not been reversed and offer contrasting ways in which the two Western European secularisms are responding to the Muslim presence. The events were the protests in Britain against the novel, *The Satanic Verses* by Sir Salman Rushdie; and in France, the decision by a school head-teacher to prohibit entry to three girls till they were willing to take off their headscarves in school premises.

*The Satanic Verses* was not banned in the UK as the protestors demanded and the conduct of some Muslims, especially those threatening the life of the author, certainly shocked and alienated many from the campaign. In that sense, the Muslim campaign clearly failed. In other respects, however, it galvanized many into seeking a democratic multiculturalism that was inclusive of Muslims. A national body was created to represent mainstream Muslim opinion, initially in relation to the novel (UK Action Committee on Islamic Action) but later, with some encouragement from both the main national political parties, especially New Labour, it led to a body to lobby on behalf of Muslims in the corridors of power. This new body, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), was accepted as a consultee by the New Labour government of 1997 till about the middle of the next decade when it looked for new interlocutors. The MCB was very successful in relation to its founding agenda (*Modood 2010b*). By 2001, it had achieved its aim of having Muslim issues and Muslims as a group recognized separately from issues of race and ethnicity; and of being itself accepted by government, media, and civil society as the spokesperson for Muslims. Another two achieved aims were the state funding of Muslim schools on the same basis as Christian and Jewish schools; and in getting certain educational and employment policies targeted on the severe disadvantage of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (who are nearly all Muslims) as opposed to on minority ethnicity generally. Additionally, it played a decisive role in getting Tony Blair to go against ministerial and civil service advice and insert a religion question into the 2001 Census (*Sherif 2011*). This meant that the ground was laid for the possible later introduction of policies targeting Muslims to match those targeting groups defined by race or ethnicity—or gender. The MCB had to wait a bit longer to get the legislative protection it sought. Laws against religious discrimination were introduced in 2003, strengthened in 2007 and again in 2010, making them much stronger than anything available in the rest of the European Union. Incitement to religious hatred, the legislation most closely connected to the protests over *The Satanic Verses* was introduced in 2006, though there is no suggestion that it would have caught that novel. Indeed, the protestors’ original demand that the blasphemy law be extended to cover Islam has been made inapplicable as the blasphemy law was abolished in 2008—with very little protest from anybody. Moreover, even as the MCB, because of its views on the government’s foreign and security policies, fell out of favor, local and national consultations with Muslim groups have continued to grow and probably now exceed consultations with any Christian body and certainly any minority group. Inevitably, this has caused occasional friction between Christians and Muslims. But on the whole, these developments have taken place
not only with the support of the leadership of the Church of England, but in a spirit of interfaith respect. (Given how adversarial English intellectual, journalistic, legal, and political culture is, religion in England is oddly fraternal and little effort is expended in proving that the other side is in a state of error and should convert.)

So, that is one path of development from 1988 to 1989. As can be seen, it was a mobilization of a minority and the extension of minority policies from race to religion in order to accommodate the religious minority. The other development, namely the one arising from *l'affaire foulard*, was one of top-down state action to prohibit certain minority practices. From the start, the majority of the country—whether it be media, the public intellectuals, the politicians, or public opinion—were supportive of the headteacher who refused to have religious headscarves in school (*Bowen 2007; Scott 2007*). Muslims either did not wish to or lacked the capacity to challenge this dominant view with anything like the publicity, organization, clamor, or international assistance that Muslims in Britain bore to bear on Rushdie’s novel.

The Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, emphasized freedom of religion as long as the religious symbols were not “ostentatious” and so ruled that the issue should be treated on a case-by-case basis (see also *Bowen 2007; Kastoryano 2006*). This quietened things down till they blew up again in 1994 in relation to another state school. On that occasion, the Minister of Education forbade the wearing of any ostentatious symbols, which explicitly included the headscarf. The issue would not go away, however, and in 2003, President Chirac appointed a national commission, chaired by Bernard Stasi, to consider the issue. The Stasi Commission recommended the banning of the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in state schools, and a law to this effect was passed with an overwhelming majority by Parliament in February, 2004. A few years later, the target of secularist and majoritarian disapproval was the full face veil with just the eyes showing (niqab; burqa), as favored by a few hundred Muslim women. This was banned in public places in April 2011. Belgium followed suit in July 2011, the Netherlands in January 2012, and Italy is in the process of doing so (*The Guardian* 2011). Similar proposals are being discussed by governments and political parties across Western Europe (e.g., the ruling Labour Party in Norway). Even in Britain, there is popular support for a ban, though the major parties have no truck with it.

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8The way that race, religion, and ethnicity do not neatly align today is illustrated by the fact that the head teacher whose inflexibility created the national crisis was a black African and two of the three girls he excluded were supported by a Jewish father (thanks to David Lehmann for pointing me to http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3149588.stm). It has in fact been argued with some justification that the post-1989 laicite is actually a much stricter interpretation than what was in place since the 1905 law that established laicite; and that those who reject the contemporary interpretation, which includes some Muslim activists, are not antisecularists but true to the spirit of the 1905 law (*Bauberot 2012*).
While the radical secularist (laïcité) trajectory of the banning of some headdress favored by some Muslim women was taking place, another was simultaneously taking place in countries like France, which is important to note as it does not so easily conform to the common understanding of French laïcité. Since 1990, each French government, whether of the left or the right, has set about trying to create a national Muslim council that would be a corporate representative of Muslims in France and the official government consultee. It would be the state’s recognition of Islam comparable in some respects to its recognition of the Catholic Church, Protestant churches, and the Jewish Consistory. After at least three abortive attempts by previous Interior Ministers, Nicholas Sarkozy, when in that post, inaugurated the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003 (Modood and Kastoryano 2006:174–75). Even now, this Council has not yet come to be accepted by the majority of Muslims in France and has had little influence on the French media, civil society, or government. Its importance for my argument does not depend on its effectiveness or on whether it has support amongst Muslims in France. I mention it because it exhibits how even a laicist, antimulticulturalist state which is supported by most citizens in attacking fundamental religious freedom is creating institutional linkages to govern Muslims in a way which is prima facie contrary to laïcité. It is not, however, contrary to the Western Europe tradition of moderate secularism and France is not alone in following a path comprising antimulticulturalist rhetoric, refusal to offer accommodation on specifics but a willingness to deal with Muslims not just as individual citizens but also as a religious group. Chancellor Merkel’s government in Germany assembled a group of Muslims in 2006 in order to hold an Islamkonfrenz at the highest level of government and this has been repeated every year. Interestingly, the secularist strand of opinion in Britain which looks to France as a model is opposed to the government giving special consultative status to Muslim organizations and sees this as consistent with the older demand for the disestablishment of the Church of England, the removal of bishops from a democratized House of Lords, and a reduction in the number of state-funded faith schools.

ADDITIONAL RESPONSES: CHRISTIAN VALUES AND MUSCULAR LIBERALISM

So, two responses have manifested themselves to Muslim action and claims-making, the accommodationist, which through dialogue, negotiation,

9Sometimes refusal at a national level is accompanied by local compromises (Bowen 2010).
10See National Secular Society and the British Humanist Association websites; for similar views amongst center-left Christians, see the website of the think-tank, Ekklesia.
and adaptation, has tried to find a space for Muslims within an older, broad racial equality, and multiculturalist orientation; and a radical secularist approach. Two other sentiments can also be identified, a Christianist and an intolerant or “muscular” liberalism. By this, I do not mean to say that Christians and liberals were not party to the first two approaches. The churches, especially the Church of England, have been actively involved in supporting British multiculturalism and developing interfaith dialogue, networks, and policy coalitions with Muslims and other minorities. Similarly, what I refer to as liberal intolerance overlaps with the secularist intolerance that has already been discussed. What is distinctive about the following two responses to Muslims is that one makes an explicit appeal to Christianity, and the other makes an explicit appeal to the limits of the prized value of toleration.

The reference to Christianity can be quite distant from policy. For example, it seems that the presence and salience of Muslims can be a factor in stimulating a Christian identity. An analysis of the voluntary religion question in the 2001 UK Census shows higher “Christian” identification in areas near large Muslim populations (Voas and Bruce 2004). The emergence of a new, sometimes politically assertive, cultural identification with Christianity has been noted in Denmark (Mouritsen 2006), and in Germany, Chancellor Merkel has recently asserted that “[t]hose who don’t accept [Christian values] don’t have a place here” (cited in Presseurop 2010 reported as “Muslims in her country should adopt Christian values”), since when several senior Bavarian politicians have made the link between German nationalism and Christianity even more emphatically (Fekete 2011:46). Similar sentiments were voiced in the European Union constitution debate and are apparent in the ongoing debate about Turkey as a future Union member (Casanova 2009). These assertions of Christianity are not necessarily accompanied by any increase in expressions of faith or church attendance, which continue to decline across Europe. What is at work is not the repudiation of a status-quo secularism (Casanova 2009) in favor of Christianity but a response to the challenge of multiculturalism (as Merkel made explicit by asserting that “multi-kulti” had failed and was not wanted back). Giscard d’Estaing, the former President of France, who chaired the Convention on the Future of Europe, the body which drafted the (abortive) EU constitution, expresses nicely the assertiveness I speak of: “I never go to Church, but Europe is a Christian continent.”

Such political views, however, are also being expressed by Christian organizations, especially by the Catholic Church. Early in his Papacy, Pope Benedict

11More recently, Prime Minister Cameron, who has confessed to not being a steadfast believer, made a major speech arguing that Britons should not be shy of asserting that Britain is a Christian country (http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/king-james-bible). While many secularists protested, the speech was welcomed by the chair of the Mosque and Community Affairs of the Muslim Council of Britain, Sheikh Ibrahim Mogra (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16231223).
XVI in a speech at the Bavarian Catholic University at Regensburg suggested that while reason was central to Christian divinity, this was not the case with the God of Islam, which licensed conversion by the sword and was deeply antithetical to the European tradition of rationality (November 2006, http://www.zenit.org/article-16955?l=english). It has been argued that Pope John Paul II “looked at the essential cleavage in the world as being between religion and unbelief. Devout Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists had more in common with each other than with atheists” (Caldwell 2009:151). Pope Benedict, the same author contends, “thinks that, within societies, believers and unbelievers exist in symbiosis. Secular Westerners, he implies, have a lot in common with their religious fellows” (Caldwell 2009:151). The suggestion is that secularists and Christians in Europe have more in common with each other than they do with Muslims. That many secularists do not share Pope Benedict’s view is evident from the fact that the proposed clause about Christianity was absent from the final draft of the abortive EU constitution. Moreover, it is indicative of the place of Christianity in Europe relative to radical secularism, that it emerged as a third, not a first or second, trend. That is to say, it joined a debate in which the running had been mainly made by an accommodationist multiculturalism and an exclusionist secularism allied with nationalism. Yet, while there is little sign of a Christian right in Europe of the kind that is strong in the United States, there is to some degree a reinforcing or renewing of a sense that Europe is “secular Christian,” analogous to the term “secular Jew” to describe someone of Jewish descent who has a sense of Jewish identity but is not religiously practicing and may even be an atheist.

A fourth trend focuses on Muslims’ conservative or illiberal moral values and practices. These are likely to center on issues of gender and sexuality and so this trend overlaps with that which has led to legal restrictions on the wearing of the headscarf and the face veil, but is worth identifying separately as it goes much wider and can be independent of questions of religion–state relations. It is alleged that the state needs to take special action against Muslims because their attitudes to, for example, but not only gender equality and sexual orientation equality are less than and threatening to reverse what has been achieved in western countries. This argument is found across the region and across the political and intellectual spectrum but is particularly strong in the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn’s call, for example, at the turn of the century, for a halt to Muslim immigration because of their views on sex and personal freedom achieved considerable electoral success (The Economist 2002). The Dutch government produced a video to be shown to prospective Muslim immigrants which included a close-up of a topless woman on a beach and gay men kissing in a park to assist in the process of assessing applicants for entry into the country (Monshipouri 2010:51). In neighboring Denmark, the newspaper, Jutlands-Posten, famously published satirical and irreverent cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad to, according to its cultural editor, assist Muslims to be acculturized into Danish public culture (Levey and Modood...
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Dutch MP of Somali Muslim origin, became an international figure through her argument that the subordination of women was a core feature of orthodox Islam. The position I am referring to could be said to be a form of liberal perfectionism, that is to say the view, in contrast to a Rawlsian neutralism, that it is the business of a liberal state to produce liberal individuals and promote a liberal way of life (Mouritsen and Olsen forthcoming), perhaps what Charles Taylor once called, liberalism as “a fighting creed” or what Prime Minister Cameron has called “muscular liberalism.” Its actual political dynamic has been to create and lead popular anti-Muslim hostility as in the form of Geert Wilders comparison of the Qur’an with Mein Kampf and campaign to ban the former as long as the latter is banned. His campaign against the “Islamization of Europe” has many echoes across Western Europe and not just the Netherlands, where the party he founded in 2005, the Party for Freedom, became the third largest party in the 2010 elections and a negotiating partner in the formation of a government (Wikipedia 2011).

**ISLAMOPHOBIA**

In relation to the topic of this article, this “muscular liberalism” is perhaps squarely with the radical secularism of the hijab and burqa bans (that is how it has been interpreted by Joppke [2009]), but I mention it separately as it is intellectually distinct and more importantly because it helps to bring out that the dynamic which political secularism—and indeed, liberalism—is being subjected to and is being tested on is the presence of Muslims and anti-Muslim hostility from various intellectual and political directions. Another example of this broad anti-Muslim coalition is the majority that voted in a referendum to ban the building of minarets in Switzerland in 2009. It has been analyzed as including those whose primary motivation is women’s rights to those “who simply feel that Islam is ‘foreign’,” who may have no problems with Muslims per se but who are not ready to accept “Islam’s acquiring of visibility in public spaces” (Mayer 2009:6), and generally did not vote “out of a desire to oppress anybody, but because they are themselves feeling threatened by what they see as an Islam invasion” (Mayer 2009:8). So, prejudiced or fearful perceptions of Islam are capable of uniting a wide range of opinion into a majority, including

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12 Even though he or at least his newspaper took a different view of an anti-Christian cartoon earlier (Fouché 2006).

13 “Perfectionist liberalism is not intolerant per se . . . . Intolerance (and conflict with traditional liberal pluralism) enters at the point where officially promoted ideals of good liberal citizenship come to be seen as so important, so threatened, and so much in conflict with specific un-civic (religious) practices and dispositions, concentrated in defined and targetable out-groups, that attempts to change, penalize or even outlaw them become legitimate” (Mouritsen and Olsen 2012).
those who have no strong views about church–state arrangements, as indeed has been apparent from the very beginning that Muslim claims became public controversies.

It means that the current challenge to secularism in Western Europe is being debated not just in terms of the wider issues of integration and multiculturalism but also in terms of a hostility to Muslims and Islam based on stereotypes and scare stories in the media that are best understood as a specific form of cultural racism that has come to be called Islamophobia (Meer and Modood 2010; Sayyid and Vakil 2010) and is largely unrelated to questions of secularism. A meta-analysis of opinion polls between 1998 and 2006 in Britain concluded that “between one in five and one in four Britons now exhibits a strong dislike of, and prejudice against, Islam and Muslims” (Field 2007:465). A Pew survey in 2008 confirmed the higher figure and found its equivalent in France to be nearly double (38 percent) and just over 50 percent in Germany (Pew Research Center 2008). These views are growing, are finding expression in the rise of extreme rightwing parties, and even in terrorism, as happened in Oslo and the island of Atoye in July 2011 (Bangstad 2011). This, to put it mildly, is not a favorable context for accommodating Muslims and underscores the point that the so-called crisis of secularism is really about the presence and integration of Muslims, which of course partly depends upon how some Muslims behave, e.g., acts of terrorism or declarations of disloyalty to the country.14

So, looking at the four trends and the wider Islamophobic climate of opinion, it looks as if the radical secularist trend and the Christianist trend could unite through a cultural nationalism or a cultural Europeanism animated by an Islamophobia. I hope not, I would like to think that the specter of a populist, rightwing nationalism, not to mention racism, will make enough people rally round a moderate secularism, which they will recognize has to be pluralized. But either way, what this analysis suggests is that the real choice is between a pluralist, multifaith nationality or Europeanism and a monoculturalist nationalism or Europeanism. Or to put it another way, the crisis of secularism is best understood within a framework of multiculturalism. Of course, multiculturalism currently has few advocates at the moment and the term is highly damaged.15 Yet the repeated declarations from the senior politicians of

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14Worth mentioning here is how some British Muslims are embracing a moderate secularism. For example, the British Muslims for Secular Democracy, set up in 2006 with a “separationist” ethos, has in recent years moderated its tone; while, from the other side, Kube, a publishing arm of the Islamic Foundation, has published a book very sympathetic to moderate secularism (Birt, Hussain, and Siddiqui 2010).

15Which does not mean subscription to the thesis that multiculturalism is in retreat. First, analysis of policies in 21 countries shows that whilst the growth of multicultural policies between 1980 and 2000 was modest, yet far from halting or retreating it accelerated between 2000 and 2010, with only three countries having a lower score in 2010 than 2000 (MCP Index: http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/table/Immigrant_Minorities_Table_2.pdf). Second, much of the antimulticulturalism cannot be justified within the terms of assimilation and individual-integration (Modood 2011, 2012).
the region that “multiculturalism is dead” (Fekete 2011) are a reaction to the continuing potency of multiculturalism which renders obsolete liberal takes on assimilation and integration in the face of new forms of public gender and public ethnicity, and now public religion. Muslims are late joiners of this movement, but when they did so, it slowly becomes apparent that the secularist status quo, with certain residual privileges for Christians, is untenable as it stands. We can call this the challenge of integration rather than multiculturalism, as long as it is understood that we are not just talking about an integration into the day-to-day life of a society but also into its institutional architecture, grand narratives, and macro-symbolic sense of itself (Modood 2012). If these issues were dead, we would not be having a debate about the role of public religion or coming up with proposals for dialogue with Muslims and the accommodation of Islam. The dynamic for change is not directly to do with the historic religion nor the historic secularism of Western Europe; rather the novelty, which then has implications for Christians and secularists and to which they are reacting, is the appearance of an assertive multiculturalism which cannot be contained within a matrix of individual rights, conscience, religion freedom, and so on. If any of these were different, the problems would be other than they are. Just as today we look at issues to do with, say, women or homosexuality not simply in terms of rights but in a political environment influenced by feminism and gay liberation, within a socio-political–intellectual culture in which the “assertion of positive difference” or “identity” is a shaping and forceful presence. It does not mean that everybody is a feminist now, but a heightened consciousness of gender and gender equality creates a certain gender-equality sensibility. Similarly, my claim is that a multiculturalist sensibility today is present in Western Europe and yet it is not comfortable with extending itself to accommodate Muslims but nor able to find reasons for not extending to Muslims without self-contradiction.

CONCLUSION

Political secularism has been destabilized, in particular the historical flow from a moderate to radical secularism and the expectation of its continuation has been jolted. This is not because of any Christian desecularization or a “return of the repressed.” Rather, the jolt is created by the triple contingency of the arrival and settlement of a significant number of Muslims; a multiculturalist sensibility which respects “difference”; and a moderate secularism, namely that the historical compromises between the state and a church or churches in relation to public recognition and accommodation are still in place to some extent. To speak of a “crisis of secularism” is exaggerated, especially in relation to the state. It is true that the challenge is much greater for laicite or radical secularism as an ideology. As many social and political theorists are sympathetic to this ideology, and in any case, being more sensitive to abstract ideas, they are less able to see the
actually existing secularism of Western Europe, with the exception of France, is not the radical variant. They thus mistakenly project the incompatibility between their ideas and the accommodation of Muslims on to the Western European states. Indeed, as applied to Western Europe, “crisis of secularism” is not only exaggerated but misleading. As I hope I have shown, the problem is more defined by issues of postimmigration integration than by the religion–state relation per se. The “crisis of secularism” is really the challenge of multiculturalism. Far from this entailing the end of secularism as we know it, moderate secularism offers some of the resources for accommodating Muslims. Political secularists should think pragmatically and institutionally on how to achieve this, namely how to multiculturalize moderate secularism, and avoid exacerbating the crisis and limiting the room for maneuver, by pressing for further, radical secularism.

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